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INTRODUCTION
Risk of exposure to environmental cleanup and other liabilities is a
growing concern of private companies that do business with the
Federal Government. Government contractors are subject to
requirements and potential liabilities imposed by myriad comprehen-
sive environmental laws and regulations that numerous agencies at
the federal, state, and local levels implement and enforce.' The legal
obligation of government contractors to comply with environmental
laws is well-established.2 Environmental issues, however, have taken
on greater importance for ,contractors as the Federal Government
struggles to manage the mounting costs associated with cleaning up
environmental contamination at the nation's military installations and
nuclear weapons complexes.3 Increasingly, contractors who operate
1. For example, at the federal level, the primary environmental laws affecting government
contractors include: the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671 (1988
& Supp. V 1993); the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. V 1993);
the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (1988); the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. IV
1992); the Clean Air Act (CAA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); and the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA
or Superfund), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
Many of the federal environmental statutes also have state counterparts that contain pollution
control requirements at least as stringent and, possibly, more stringent, than federal law.
2. See infra Part lA-C (establishing basis for contractor liability through discussion of
federal and state environmental laws).
3. See, e.g., Terry Atias, U.S.: Billions More Needed to Clean Up Arms Plants, CHI. TRIB., July
4, 1990, at 4 (reporting Department of Energy projection that cleanup of nuclear weapons
facilities will cost $30 billion over five-year period); Cleanup of Non-DOE Federal Sites Could Cost
Taxpayers Billions, NUCLEARWASTE NEWS,July 15,1993, available in LEXIS, Envirn Library, Allnws
File (relaying conclusions of congressional report that identified radioactive contamination of
nuclear waste at federal facilities as environmental liabilities); DOD Cleanup Costs Scrutinized,
ENGINEERING NEws-REc., May 31, 1993, at 5, available in LEXIS, Envirn Library, Allnws File
(reporting that environmental cleanup costs for 15 of DOD's largest contractors was estimated
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at these federal military facilities are being targeted to pay for both
the cleanup and resulting damages.'
The most significant factor with respect to government contractor
liability, however, is the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's
(EPA) recent focus on contractors as enforcement targets. The EPA,
the primary federal agency responsible for implementing and
enforcing the nation's environmental laws, adopted a new policy in
1988 to "pursue the full range of [EPA] enforcement authorities
against contractor operators of government-owned facilities in
appropriate circumstances."5 In addition, government contractors
face increasingly comprehensive and stringent regulatory require-
ments of federal, state, and local environmental laws,6 and the
explosive growth in the last decade of environmental liabilities
imposed by federal and state courts.7
The concerns of government contractors regarding environmental
issues thus are well-founded. Government contractors face environ-
mental liabilities in contexts covering the full range of possible
contracts and arrangements between contractors and the government,
including: (1) the contractor that operates a government-owned
facility (GOCO-government-owned/contractor-operated); (2) the
contractor that leases or occupies space at a federal facility and
typically performs services for the government; (3) the contractor that
at $2.1 billion over next several years); Federal Facility Cleanup Costs Cannot Be Estimated, Congress
Told, NUCLEAR WAsTE NEvS, Sept. 23, 1993, available in LEXIS, Envim Library, Allnws File
(reporting that cleanup for DOE and DOD sites alone could reach $500 billion); Michael
Satchell, Uncle Sam's Toxic Folly, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar. 27, 1989, at 20 (asserting that
largest, most difficult and costly environmental cleanup in U.S. history will be radioactive and
chemical waste at federal nuclear weapons plants and military installations). Federal facility
cleanup expenses have rocketed from $183 million for 276 projects in fiscal year 1984 to $12
billion budgeted for 10,200 projects in fiscal year 1993. Satchell, supra, at 20; see also infra notes
8, 17 and accompanying text (discussing environmental contamination at nation's military bases
and staggering estimated cleanup costs).
4. See infra Part II (discussing causes and effects of U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's
targeting of government contractors for cleanup liabilities).
5. OFFICE OF FED. AcrrvmEs, U.S. ENvrL. PROTECTION AGENCY, REP. No. 130/4-8g/003,
FEDERAL FAcILITIEs COMPLIANCE STRATEGY VI-14 (1988) [hereinafter COMPLIANCE STRATEGY].
But of. Environmental Compliance by Federal Agencies: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and
Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 194-95 (1987)
[hereinafter Federal Environmental Compliance Hearing] (statement of F. Henry Habicht II,
Assistant Attorney General, Land and Natural Resources Division, U.S. Department of'Justice)
(asserting thatJustice Department does not treat government contractors differently than other
private parties).
6. See infra Part LA-C (discussing primary federal environmental statutes, state
implementation and enforcement programs, and common-law tort theories as sources of
contractor liability).
7. See Kyle E. McSlarrow et al., A Decade of Superfund Litigation: CERCLA Case Law from
1981-1991, 21 ENvTL. L REP. 10,367, 10,368 (1991) (concluding that expansion of CERCLA
liability "has continued unabated and began to encompass government activities at all levels").
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produces products or other materials for the Federal Government at
the contractor's own facility (COCO-contractor-owned/contractor-
operated); and (4) the contractor that the Federal Government re-
tains to perform environmental cleanup projects at federal facilities
or Superfund sites.8 Although the relative scope of the risk may vary,
the environmental concerns and potential exposure of the contractor
under each of these scenarios is significant.
This Article addresses the increased significance of environmental
issues in government contracting and discusses ways that government
contractors can minimize and manage their risk of exposure to
environmental cleanup and other liabilities. Part I reviews the sources
of environmental liabilities for government contractors. Part II
examines why the EPA increasingly is targeting government contrac-
tors for environmental cleanups. Part III discusses the so-called
"contractor defense" and why it has not allayed the environmental
concerns of government contractors. Part IV examines contractual
agreements and protections that may minimize the government
contractor's environmental risks. Finally, Part V sets forth ways that
government contractors can minimize and manage environmental
cleanup and other liabilities while ensuring compliance with the
broad range of environmental laws and regulations affecting their
Federal Government projects.
I. SOURCES OF ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITIES FOR GOVERNMENT
CONTRACTORS
One of the main reasons for the growing significance of environ-
mental issues in government contracting is the emergence and growth
over the last twenty years of environmental laws containing broad
liability and penalty provisions.9 Statutory and regulatory develop-
ments at the federal, state, and local levels have resulted in complex,
often overlapping, environmental regulatory regimes that impose
8. COMPLANCE STRATEGY, supra note 5, exhibit 111-2, at 111-7. The fourth arrangement
described above is not directly addressed in any of the categories identified by EPA in the
Compliance Strategy. Nonetheless, government contractors face increasing environmental
exposure in this context as the Departments of Defense and Energy struggle with the significant
environmental contamination problems posed by the nation's military bases and nuclear
weapons facilities. See RESOURCES, COMMUNrrY AND ECON. DEV. Div., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, GAO/RCED NO. 93-167, DOE MANAGEMENT: CONSISTENT CLEANUP PoLicy Is NEEDED
2 (1993) [hereinafter GAO/DOE REPORT] (estimating that cleanup of weapons complex will
exceed $160 billion and take at least 30 years); see also infra note 17 and accompanying text
(providing other cost estimates of environmental cleanup of U.S. military bases).
9. See supra note 1 (identifying primary environmental laws affecting government
contractors).
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significant controls on ongoing business activities." Under these
regimes, government contractors risk substantial liability for past
management of hazardous substances, even if the activities were legal
at the time and undertaken in accordance with then-acceptable
standards and requirements." Moreover, common-law doctrines of
nuisance, trespass, and strict liability are being used with increasing
frequency by private parties seeking compensation for personal
injuries and property damage related to environmental pollution."
The current environmental regulatory scheme reflects Congress'
response to mounting public concern about environmental conditions
and, in particular, alarm over hazardous waste disposal practices that
have been increasingly identified as the cause of injury, illness, and
property damage." These general concerns regarding environmen-
tal conditions mirror recent specific concerns raised regarding
environmental conditions at federal facilities. For example, both
civilian and military Federal Government facilities routinely produce,
manage, and dispose of large quantities of hazardous waste. 4 An
estimated twenty million tons of hazardous or mixed hazardous and
radioactive waste are generated annually by the Department of Energy
(DOE) and the Department of Defense (DOD) alone. 5 As recently
10. See infra notes 94-107 and accompanying text (discussing state environmental laws and
interplay between state and federal regulation at federal facilities).
11. Courts consistently have held that liability under CERCLA encompasses activities that
occurred prior to CERCLA's enactment in 1980, even if such activities were legal at the time.
See, e.g., United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726,732-33 (8th Cir. 1986)
(holding that"effective date" of CERCLA merely indicates date when action can first be brought
and that effectiveness of CERCLA requires application to past conduct); Kelley v. Thomas
Solvent Co., 714 F. Supp. 1439, 1442-45 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (upholding retroactive application
of CERCLA because "legislation readjusting rights and burdens is not unlawful solely because
it upsets otherwise settled expectations... even though the effect of the legislation is to impose
a new duty or liability on past acts") (citing Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 16
(1976)); United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1072-73 (D. Colo. 1985) (concluding
that retroactive application of CERCLA is consonant with Congress' intent to impose cleanup
costs of polluters).
12. See Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp., 281 Cal. Rptr. 827, 833-34 (Ct. App. 1991)
(finding that recent California cases recognize definition of nuisance "broad enough to
encompass almost every conceivable type of interference with the enjoyment or use of land or
property," including direct injury to property from hazardous waste contamination caused by or
resulting from former lessee's activities); see also infra notes 104-05 and accompanying text
(discussing potential liability of contractors under common-law theories).
13. See H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., Pt. 1, at 17-18 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120 (urging passage of CERCLA because existing law is inadequate to deal
with "a major new source of environmental concern.., the tragic consequences of improperly,
negligently, and recklessly hazardous waste disposal practices... [which have] received national
attention amidst growing public and Congressional concern over the magnitude of the
problem").
14. See H.R. REP. No. 111, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1992), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1287, 1288 (identifying history of noncompliance by federal facilities with hazardous and solid
waste disposal requirements under RCRA).
15. Id.
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as 1991, 116 federal facilities, identified as DOE, DOD, Department
of Transportation, Department of the Interior, and Small Business
Administration facilities, have been included on the federal
Superfund list of the nation's most contaminated waste sites.16
Additionally, many other federal facilities have not yet been fully
evaluated to determine whether the degree and nature of contamina-
tion requires their inclusion on the Superfund list.
1 7
The potential exposure of the government contractor is broad.
The activities of government contractors, such as performing services
or manufacturing goods for federal agencies, potentially subject these
contractors to substantial environmental compliance costs, cleanup
liabilities, and other requirements imposed by environmental statutes
and regulations. 8 In addition, such activities potentially subject
contractors to environmental liability for personal injuries and
property damage under common law. 9 Finally, government contrac-
tors may be liable for all or a portion of the cleanup costs at some
federal facilities, particularly at GOCO facilities and facilities owned
by the Federal Government but leased to private parties.2"
A. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act
The primary federal statute addressing the cleanup of inactive
hazardous waste sites is the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA, also commonly referred
16. Id. at 3, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1289.
17. Id. During recent testimony before the Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission, PatrickJ. Meehan, director of the Office of Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense,
estimated that one-time environmental cleanup costs for the nation's military bases would be
$410 million between 1994 and 1999. Savings from Shutting Donrn Bases Exceed Costs of Cleanups,
Officials Say, 23 ENV'T REP. 3050 (Mar. 26,1993). This figure, however, was derived from military
base estimates prepared before the bases were placed on the closure list, and without the benefit
of completed environmental studies. Id. Most experts believe that actual environmental
cleanup costs at the nation's military bases will be much higher. See supra note 3 (reporting
projections of environmental cleanup at federal facilities). For fiscal 1994, the Department of
Defense is seeking $2.3 billion for its environmental program, mostly for actual cleanup of
contaminated sites. DOD Seels $2.3B for Cleanup of Contaminated Sites in IY 1994, 59 Fed. Cont.
Rep. (BNA) 559, 559 (Apr. 26, 1993).
18. See infra notes 64-88 and accompanying text (detailing, by way of example, RCRA
requirements for treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste, including permits,
recordkeeping, and reporting, as well as penalties and corrective actions that may be imposed
for violations).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 104-07 (discussing common-law theories as source of
environmental liability for government contractors).
20. See infra text accompanying notes 32-52 (explaining liability scheme of CERC.A under
which persons who generated or transported hazardous substances may be jointly and severally
liable).
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to as Superfund).21 CERCLA was enacted in 1980 to address the
public health threat posed by the nation's worst abandoned or
inactive hazardous waste sites.22 Congress amended the statute
significantly in 198623 to authorize an additional ten billion dollars
for Superfund cleanups, 24 to establish stringent national cleanup
standards for Superfund sites,' and to create new, independent
regulatory programs, such as the Emergency Planning and Communi-
ty Right-to-Know Act.2
6
Under CERCLA, EPA has a number of enforcement tools for
responding to releases or threatened releases of hazardous substances
into the environment. Under its authority to "secure such relief as
may be necessary"2 to abate a danger or a threat, EPA may order a
party to cease immediately its activities.28 It can also direct a
potentially responsible party (commonly referred to as a "PRP") to
conduct a remedial investigation and to clean up a site, or to finance
an environmental cleanup.29 Where a PRP is unable or unwilling to
pay or is unavailable to clean up a site, EPA can clean up the site
directly.3" To fund the cleanups and finance certain response
actions, EPA can draw on an eight and one-half billion dollar trust
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
22. See H.R. REP. No. 1016, supra note 13, at 17-18, 1980 U.S.C.CA.N. at 6120 (stating that
in 1979, EPA estimated that approximately 30,000 to 50,000 improperly managed hazardous
waste sites existed in United States, of which 1200 to 2000 were believed to present serious risk
to public health).
23. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat.
1613 (1986) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). In November 1990, Congress
extended the taxing authority under CERCLA through December 1995. Pub. L. No. 101-508,
104 Stat. 1388-319 (1990) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1988 & Supp. TV 1992)). The statute
currently is on the agenda for legislative reauthorization. No substantive legislative action is
expected before mid-1994 because significant concerns have been raised regarding CERCLA's
broad liability scheme. See NATIONAL COMM'N ON SUPERFUND, FINAL CONSENSUS REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL COMMISSION ON SUPERFUND vi (prepublication draft Dec. 21, 1993) (proposing
revision of CERCLA liability system and recommending "creation and implementation of fair-
share allocation approach"); see also ABA STANDING COMM. ON ENVrL. LAW, REPORT TO THE
HOUSE OF DELEGATES WrrH RECOMMENDATION TO AMEND CERCLA 1 (1994) ("In many instances,
[CERCLA] has also resulted in imposition of liability grossly disproportionate to the conduct
involved.").
24. 42 U.S.C. § 9611 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
25. Id. § 9621.
26. Id. §§ 11001-11050.
27. Id. § 9606(a).
28. Id. (authorizing abatement actions where there is "imminent and substantial
endangerment to the public health or welfare").
29. Id. § 9604(a) (1) (allowing, upon EPA approval, removal and other remedial actions by
potentially responsible parties). The term "potentially responsible party" ("PRP") is not defined
in CERCLA, but is used synonymously with the categories of responsible parties under § 107(a)
of CERCLA. See infra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 9604 (authorizing EPA removal and response actions, as well as
investigations, monitoring, and testing to obtain information on hazardous substance release).
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fund (the Superfund), which is funded primarily by industry" and
federal appropriations. 2 Under CERCLA's liability scheme, the
United States, a state, or a private party can bring an action against
a responsible party to recover cleanup costs or other response costs
incurred under CERCLA. 3
Section 107(a) of CERCLA establishes four categories of "respon-
sible" parties who may be liable for the costs incurred to clean up a
release or threatened release 4 of hazardous substances: 35 (1) the
current owner and operator of a vessel or facility;36 (2) any person
who owned or operated the facility at the time of disposal of
hazardous substances (past owner and operator);17 (3) any person
who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged, directly or
indirectly, for disposal or treatment of hazardous substances (genera-
tor) ;38 and (4) any person who transported hazardous substances to
the site (transporter). 9
Under CERCLA's liability scheme, federal agencies, such as DOD
and DOE, typically are responsible parties as the current or past
owners of government-owned facilities, including facilities where the
31. See 26 U.S.C. § 9507(b) (1988) (providing for taxation of petroleum products and
certain inorganic chemicals to fund Superfund).
32. See42 U.S.C. § 9611 (specifying authorized uses, limitations, funding requirements, and
other details of Hazardous Substance Superfund).
33. Id. § 9607(a). Environmental cleanups under CERCLA can be very expensive in terms
of both liability and transaction costs, such as attorney's fees, administrative time, consultant
fees, and expert witness costs. See BRADFORD F. WHITMAN, SUPERFUND LAW AND PRACTICE 5-6
(1991) (concluding that "stakes" of CERCLA action are extremely high). Estimated response
costs at a typical cleanup site listed by EPA on the National Priorities List include an average of
$1.3 million for a complete Remedial Investigation and Feasibility Study (RI/FS), $1.5 million
for remedial design, $25 million for remedial action, and nearly $4 million for 30-year operation
and maintenance of the site. Id.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (4) (creating liability where there is "release or a threatened release
... of a hazardous substance"). CERCLA broadly defines the term "release" to include "any
spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping,
leaching, dumping or disposing into the environment." Id. § 9601(22). As the statutory
language makes clear, there does not have to be an actual release of a hazardous substance. For
example, the storage of hazardous substances in deteriorating drums may present a "threat" of
release, subjecting the facility to CERCLA liability. SeeNewYorkv. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d
1032, 1045 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding "threatened release" where hazardous substances where
stored in corroding tanks and drums, and site owner lacked expertise in waste disposal).
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (defining term "hazardous substance" by reference to other
federal environmental statutes, including Clean Water Act, Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act, Clean Air Act, Toxic Substances Control Act, but specifically excluding petroleum, natural
gas, and synthetic gas usable for fuel).
36. Id. § 9607(a) (1). Current owners and operators are liable for environmental cleanup
costs-even if they did not own or operate the site at the time of disposal or cause the release of
hazardous substances. See Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at 1044 (holding present owner liable even
though he had not caused or contributed to environmental contamination).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2).
38. Id. § 9607(a)(3).
39. Id. § 9607(a)(4).
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government operates all of the activity, facilities leased by the
government to contractors or other private parties, and GOCO
facilities.' In the latter two scenarios, the government contractor
also may be a responsible party as the operator of the facility.41 In
addition, contractors and other parties operating at government-
owned facilities may be liable for response costs if they arranged for
the disposal of hazardous substances that required a CERCLA
cleanup, even if they did not own the waste or cause the contamina-
tion.42 With respect to COCO facilities, the contractor is potentially
liable for cleanup costs as an owner and operator, generator, or
transporter of hazardous substances. Under this scenario, CERCLA
liability generally is not shared with the Government, unless the
government agency arranged for disposal of the hazardous substanc-
es43 or unless a contractual arrangement provides otherwise."
Courts have consistently held that liability under CERCLA is strict,
retroactive, and joint and several.4" Section 101(32) provides that
the standard of liability under CERCLA will be the same standard of
liability imposed by section 311 of the Clean Water Act (CWA). 46
Based on the legislative history of CERCLA and on judicial interpreta-
tions of section 311 of the CWA, courts have concluded that CERCLA
imposes strict liability on responsible parties.47 Similarly, courts have
40. See id. § 9620 (a) (1) (providing express application of CERCLA to facilities owned or
operated by "department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States").
41. See id. § 9620(a) (2) (holding liable under CERCLA all facilities that are "owned or
operated by a department, agency, or instrumentality of the United States").
42. See United States v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823,847 (W.D. Mo.
1984) (finding corporate executive who had direct supervision over and knowledge of hazardous
waste disposal practices liable under CERCLA even though he did not actually own waste). But
see United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884, 893 (E.D.N.C. 1985) (using language suggesting that
Government must prove defendant owned or possessed hazardous substances to establish liability
under § 107(a) (3) of CERCLA).
43. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (3).
44. See infra notes 54-57 and accompanying text (discussing fact that Government and
contractor may agree to apportion liability, but such agreements are ineffective to negate
underlying liability).
45. See, e.g., NewYork v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985) (declaring
that Congress intended responsible parties to be strictly liable under CERCLA); Amland
Properties Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 711 F. Supp. 784, 790-91 (D.NJ. 1989) (finding
retroactive application of CERCLA to private parties supported by case law and purpose of
statute); United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053,1059-60 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (asserting that
imposition ofjoint and several liability promotes legislative intent).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(32).
47. See, e.g., Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146, 1152-54
(1st Cir. 1989) (concluding that nothing in language, legislative history, or case law of CERCLA
supports argument that proof of causation must be provided); United States v. Monsanto Co.,
858 F.2d 160, 167-68 (4th Cir. 1988) (finding that plain language of CERCLA establishes strict
liability scheme under which culpability is not prerequisite for liability); United States v. Bliss,
667 F. Supp. 1298, 1304 (E.D. Mo. 1987) (construing CERCLA liability to be strict, "without
regard to liable party's fault or state of mind").
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held that CERCLA must apply retroactively to effectuate its remedial
purposes.48 As a result, parties can be held liable for acts or omis-
sions that occurred well before the date of CERCLA's enactment,
even if such acts or omissions were legal when they occurred.49
With respect to contractor liability, it is even more significant that
courts have determined that CERCLA imposes joint and several
liability at sites where more than one party may be responsible under
section 107 for the cleanup of contamination." At multiparty sites,
it is possible that one responsible party can be held liable for more
than its share of cleanup costs and can, in fact, be held liable for
cleanup of the entire site.5 If the environmental harm is reasonably
divisible, liability may be apportioned among the responsible
parties.5" In most multiple-generator hazardous waste sites, however,
there will be no reasonable basis for apportioning liability.5"
Thus, under CERCLA's broad liability scheme, government
contractors can be held liable for the entire cleanup cost of a federal
or non-federal facility where hazardous substances have been
disposed, regardless of whether the contractor exercised due care or
otherwise complied with the applicable legal requirements for
handling hazardous substances, and regardless of whether the
contractor caused or contributed to contamination at the facility.
Moreover, a government contractor's potential liability under
48. See, e.g., Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., 748 F. Supp. 283, 287-89 (E.D. Pa. 1990)
(finding retroactive application of CERCLA clearly supported by overriding remedial purpose
of statute); Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 714 F. Supp. 1439, 1443-44 (W.D. Mich. 1989)
(rejecting argument that retroactive application of CERCLA is unconstitutional); United States
v. Northeastern Pharm. & Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 839 (W.D. Mo. 1984) (determining
from case law and legislative history that Congress intended CERCLA to apply retroactively), aff d
in part and ev'd in par 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986).
49. See Thomas Solvent 714 F. Supp. at 1439 (striking down defenses to retroactive
application of CERCLA as not within statute's enumerated defenses); Amland Properties, 711 F.
Supp. at 790-91 (rejecting argument that in private actions, CERCLA should not apply to
conduct occurring prior to statute's enactment).
50. See United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (stating
that because Congress intended scope of CERCLA liability to be determined in accordance with
"traditional and evolving principles of common law,"joint and several liability is imposed where
two or more persons cause single indivisible harm).
51. See, e.g., United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc., 889 F.2d 1497, 1507 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding
that party liable for indivisible harm has right of contribution against other defendants under
CERCLA); Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 171-73 (recognizing defendants' concern over "just" apportion-
ment of liability for response costs but noting availability of contribution action to address such
issue).
52. See United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 268-69 (3d Cir. 1992) (stating
that CERCLA defendants may escape joint and several liability by demonstrating that harm is
subject to reasonable apportionment under divisibility rule recognized in RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965)).
53. See, e.g., United States v. Stringfellow, 661 F. Supp. 1053, 1060 (C.D. Ca. 1987) (stating
that in multi-generator sites harm is incapable of division due to synergistic effects of
commingling different wastes).
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CERCLA cannot be eliminated by any contractual agreement between
the contractor and federal agency for apportioning environmental
cleanup liabilities. CERCLA specifically provides that no indemnifica-
tion, hold harmless, or similar agreement shall negate liability in
CERCLA cost-recovery actions.54 Such agreements, however, are not
prohibited,55 and a federal agency may agree to assume the govern-
ment contractor's hazardous waste cleanup costs regardless of whether
the agency itself has any liability under CERCLA. 6 In this situation,
although the contractor is still liable under CERCLA, the contractor
will have a contractual claim for reimbursement from the federal
agency5
7
In order to escape liability, a government contractor must invoke
one of three defenses to CERCLA liability. To avoid CERCLA
liability, a responsible party must establish that the release or
threatened release of hazardous substances was caused by "(1) an act
of God; (2) an act of war; [or] (3) an act or omission of a third party
other than an employee or agent of the defendant" or one who has
a contractual relationship with the defendant.58  Government
contractors, by virtue of their relationship to or involvement with the
contaminated site, generally will not be in a position to avail
themselves of any of these defenses.
B. Other Federal Environmental Laws Potentially Applicable to
Government Contractors
A myriad of other federal environmental laws regulate day-to-day
operations and activities of contractors performing projects for the
Federal Government.59 These laws include, but are not limited to:
(1) the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA),6 ° which
regulates the management of hazardous waste; (2) the Clean Air Act
54. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(e) (1988).
55. Id.
56. See, eg., Kaufman & Broad-South Bay v. Unisys Corp., 822 F. Supp. 1468, 1473 (N.D.
Cal. 1993) (stating that private parties can enter into agreements between themselves to
apportion CEROLA liability, but they cannot alter their underlying liability to EPA to remediate
contamination); see also infra note 57 and accompanying text.
57. See Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1459 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding
that contractual arrangements apportioning CERCLA liability between responsible parties cannot
alter or excuse underlying liability, but can only change who ultimately pays that liability).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). The third-party defense is applicable only provided the defendant
exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substances concerned and that he or she took
precautions against the foreseeable acts or omissions of the third party and any foreseeable
consequences. Id.
59. See supra note 1 (listing various federal environmental laws applicable to government
contractors).
60. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
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(CAA)," which controls emissions of hazardous air pollutants; (3)
the Clean Water Act (CWA),62 which governs the discharge of
pollutants into waters of the United States; and (4) the Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA), 3 which prescribes requirements for
the manufacture, use, and disposal of harmful chemicals in the
marketplace. These environmental laws generally impose stringent
monitoring, reporting, and other compliance requirements on certain
specified classes of persons, such as owners, operators, and generators.
A detailed review of the regulatory requirements imposed by RCRA
on hazardous waste facilities illustrates the impact environmental laws
may have on both federal agency activities and government contrac-
tors performing projects for the Government.
Congress enacted RCRA in 1976 to provide "cradle-to-grave"
management of hazardous Waste by imposing requirements on
generators and transporters of hazardous wastes, and on owners and
operators of facilities that treat, store, or dispose 'of hazardous
wastes. 4  Under RCRA regulations, the definition of "operator' is
"the person responsible for the overall operation of a facility."5
This definition clearly encompasses government contractors who
operate at federal facilities.
The requirements of RCRA generally apply to the Federal Govern-
ment. Section 6001 of RCRA provides that all branches of the
Federal Government with jurisdiction over any solid waste manage-
ment facility or disposal site must comply with federal, state, and local
solid and hazardous waste disposal requirements, both substantive and
procedural, in the same manner and to the same extent as any private
person subject to such requirements.' In 1992, the Federal Facility
Compliance Act further amended RCRA to clarify that the definition
of "persons" under RCRA encompassed "each department, agency,
and instrumentality of the United States"" and that the Government
61. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q.
62. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
63. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
64. See H.R REP. No. 1491, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 2-4, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.CA.N.
6238, 6239-42 (stating that RCRA legislation is designed to eliminate unregulated land disposal
of discarded materials and hazardous wastes). "From point of generation, through transporta-
tion, storage, treatment and disposal, those wastes listed [pursuant to EPA criteria] as hazardous
are federally regulated." Id. at 5, 1976 U.S.C.CA.N. at 6242.
65. 40 C.F.R. § 260.10 (1993).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 6961(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Other environmental laws contain similar
provisions regarding federal facility compliance. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a)
(1988); Safe Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300j-6(a); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7418(a).
67. Federal Facility Compliance Act, Pub. L. No. 102-386, sec. 103, § 1004(15), 106 Stat.
1505, 1507 (1992) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6903(15) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)).
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would be subject to fines for RCRA violations.6" The applicability of
RCRA and other environmental laws to the Federal Government,
however, is not without limits: the principle of sovereign immunity,
which states that the Federal Government is not always subject to
federal law,69 must also be considered.
Government contractors, of course, do not enjoy the protections of
sovereign immunity and, therefore, will be fully subject to environ-
mental laws, even when the Government is not.7° RCRA compliance
obligations, therefore, apply to government contractors that directly
operate federal facilities, lease space at federal facilities, or otherwise
generate, transport, treat, store, or dispose of hazardous wastes in
fulfilling their government contract obligations.'
For example, owners and operators of treatment, storage, and
disposal (TSD) facilities must have a permit issued by EPA, or issued
under an authorized state RCRA program, 2 and are subject to
extensive regulatory requirements."3 In a 1987 policy memorandum,
EPA declared that government contractors, not federal agencies,
generally should be the primary signatories on TSD facility permit
applications and permits.' The policy memorandum stated,
"Whenever a contractor or contractors at a government-owned facility,
[sic] are responsible or partially responsible for the operation,
management or oversight of hazardous waste activities at the facility;
they should sign the [TSD] permit as the operator(s)."'  The
memorandum concluded that, because contractors will usually satisfy
68. Id. sec. 102, § 6001, 106 Stat. at 1505 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (a).
69. See infra notes 112-63 and accompanying text (discussing constitutional and statutory
limitations on applicability of environmental laws to Federal Government); see also United States
Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 1627, 1633 (1992) (noting common rule that any waiver of
Federal Government's sovereign immunity must be unequivocal).
70. See infra notes 107-78 and accompanying text (discussing causes and effects of increased
environmental enforcement against government contractors).
71. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.1-264.1102 (1993) (identifying hazardous waste standards applicable
under RCRA to generators and transporters of hazardous waste and to owners and operators of
hazardous waste facilities).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 6926 (1988); see also infra notes 94-95 and accompanying text (discussing
authorized state RCRA programs).
73. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 270.1-.73 (detailing EPA's Hazardous Waste Permit Program); id.
§§ 264.1-.1102 (providing standards for owners and operators of hazardous waste treatment,
storage, and disposal facilities).
74. Memorandum from Gene Lucero, Director, Office of Waste Programs Enforcement,
EPA, and Marcia E. Williams, Director, Office of Waste, EPA, to EPA Waste Management
Division Directors Regions I-X, at 1 (June 24, 1987) (on file with The American Universii Law
Re7.Id).75. Id. at 1.
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this test, they should be responsible for signing the permit applica-
tion.76
TSD facilities also must comply with hazardous waste manifest
requirements. 7 EPA has promulgated standards that govern the
location, design, construction, operation maintenance, insurance,
monitoring, contingency planning, training, closure, and other aspects
of TSD operations.7' EPA can compel owners and operators of TSD
facilities, including government contractors that operate federal
facilities, to take potentially costly corrective action whenever a release
of hazardous waste or constituents from any solid waste management
unit occurs, regardless of the time at which the waste was placed in
such units.79  Furthermore, TSD facilities are subject to extensive
recordkeeping and reporting requirements,0 and owners and
operators of TSD facilities must demonstrate that their financial
resources are adequate to properly close the facilities."
In addition to these regulatory requirements under RCRA, virtually
all environmental laws, including RCRA, contain enforcement
provisions authorizing EPA to seek administrative, civil, or criminal
penalties against government contractors and others, including key
individuals within corporations, for failure to comply with regulatory
requirements. 2 For example, violations of RCRA may result in the
76. Id.
77. See 40 C.F.R. § 264.71 (outlining manifest requirements for owners and operators of
TSD facilities). RCRA's manifest provisions require hazardous waste to be accompanied at all
times by a manifest that details the composition of the waste, the identity of involved parties,
and other related information. Id. § 262.20.
78. See id. §§ 264.10-.19 (providing national standards of management for TSD facilities).
Specific hazardous waste management requirements have been established for certain types of
units, such as containers, id. §§ 264.170-.178; tanks, id. §§ 264.190-.199; surface impoundments,
id. §§ 264.220-.231; waste piles, id. §§ 264.250-.259; land treatment, id. §§ 264.270-.283; landfills,
id. §§ 264.300-.317; and incinerators, id. §§ 264.340-.351.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 6924(u) (1988); 40 C.F.R. § 264.90(a) (1993). RCRA also requires
corrective action beyond the facility boundaries when necessary to protect human health and
the environment. 40 C.F.R. § 264.101(c).
80. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 264.70-.77 (detailing RCRA requirements for maintenance of records
and reports).
81. See id. § 264.143 (describing various methods of insuring sufficiency of financial
resources to close TSD facility).
82. See, e.g., TSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 2615 (providing civil and criminal sanctions for enforcement
of TSCA); Federal Water Pollution Control Act (FWPCA), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b), (c), (g)
(punishing violations of FWPCA with criminal, civil, and administrative penalties); RCRA, 42
U.S.C. § 6928 (outlining civil and administrative fines for RCRA violations); CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9609, 9613 (describing administrative and civil penalties available under CERCLA). EPA
estimates that civil penalties collected under RCRA in 1993 will exceed $19 million, which is
more than EPA has collected for both civil penalties and administrative settlements combined
in any one year. See EPA Expects to Collect Record Fines Under RCRA in 1993, O'Keefe Tells ABA,
DAILY ENV'T RFP., Sept. 13,1993, at A-1. According to EPA, RCRA currently yields a median civil
penalty of $600,000, a tenfold increase over 1989. Id. In addition, EPA has improved
enforcement by reducing penalties in exchange for implementation of environmentally
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imposition of administrative or civil judicial penalties of up to $25,000
per day of violation.' A "knowing" violation of the statute is a
felony" and may result in monetary penalties of up to $50,000 for
each day of violation or imprisonment for up to five years, or both.'
Potential penalties for second and subsequent offenses are doubled
with respect to both the fine and imprisonment. 6 Violators who fail
to take corrective action within the time specified in a RCRA
compliance order may suffer a penalty of up to $25,000 for each day
of continued noncompliance and risk suspension of their hazardous
waste permit.87 Any person who transports, treats, stores, exports, or
disposes of hazardous waste and knowingly and imminently endangers
another person is guilty of a felony and may be subject to a penalty
of up to $250,000 or fifteen years imprisonment, or both.'
Most enforcement actions arise out of violations discovered during
onsite facility inspections.89 Whereas section 3007 of RCRA requires
EPA to inspect federal TSD facilities on an annual basis,9 RCRA
requires only biannual inspections of non-federal TSD facilities.91
Thus, government contractors operating at GOCO facilities are more
likely to be subject to EPA oversight than are private parties, and are
more likely to be the focus of EPA enforcement actions. To further
complicate the situation, states with authorized hazardous waste
programs also may conduct inspections of any federal or non-federal
facility to ensure the facility's compliance with the state program.
92
protective measures. Id.
83. 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (1988).
84. See id. § 6929 (d)-(e) (describing circumstances in which felony sanctions apply to RCRA
violators). The test for whether a violation was committed "knowingly" is whether the
corporation and/or individual charged actually knew or should have known of the environmen-
tal requirement. See, e.g., United States v. Hayes Int'l, 786 F.2d 1499, 1503-05 (11th Cir. 1986)
(holding that ignorance of RCRA's applicability to paint waste did not constitute defense to
criminal charges under § 6928(d) (1)); see also United States v. Hoflin, 880 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir.
1989) (holding that actual knowledge that waste disposal permit had not been obtained was not
requirement for conviction under RCRA).
85. 42 U.S.C. § 6928(d).
86. Id.
87. Id. § 6928(c).
88. Id. § 6928(e).
89. See David Schnapf, State Hazardous Waste Programs Under the Federal Resource Conservation
and Recoveiy Act, 12 ENVTL L. 679, 733 (1982) (explaining that enforcement of RCRA depends
upon on-site inspection).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 6927(c) (1988).
91. Id. § 6927(e)(1).
92. Id. § 6927(c).
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C. State Environmental Laws May Be a Source of Liability for
Government Contractors
Contractors performing projects for the Government also are
subject to state environmental laws that regulate day-to-day activities
and environmental cleanups at federal and non-federal facilities.
Many of the major federal environmental statutes, such as RCRA,
CWA, CAA, and the Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA),93 require EPA
to develop compliance standards and then delegate implementation
and enforcement authority to the states.94 The state program must
be at least as stringent as EPA's program. 5 In addition, Executive
Order 12,088,96 signed by President Carter in 1978, articulates the
President's expectation that federal facilities will comply with
applicable state pollution-control standards.97 As a result, state
environmental laws significantly affect environmental compliance by
federal facilities and government contractors performing activities for
the Federal Government.
Because many states have environmental statutes or regulations that
are more stringent than federal laws,9" state environmental agencies
can add an often conflicting and complicating viewpoint to environ-
mental compliance and cleanup issues. For example, federal-state
conflicts often arise when environmental cleanups occur at federal
93. 21 U.S.C. § 349; 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26.
94. See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c) (requiring EPA to stop issuing permits under
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) upon state assumption of NPDES
program); SDWA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 30 0g-1, 300g-2 (mandating establishment of maximum drinking
water contaminant levels by EPA and enforcement of such standards by states); RCRA, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 6922(a), 6926(b) (ordering EPA to set standards for generators of hazardous waste and
authorizing states to administer and enforce them); CAA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7409(a), 7410(a)
(instructing EPA to prescribe national ambient air quality standards, which states shall
implement and enforce).
95. See, e.g., CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(c) (requiring state NPDES program to conform to EPA
standards); SDWA, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-2 (ordering states to adopt drinking water regulations that
are no less stringent than federal standards); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6926(b) (withholding
authorization of state hazardous waste program if inconsistent with federal program); CAA, 42
U.S.C. § 7410(a) (compelling states to adopt plan for implementing national ambient air quality
standards).
96. 3 C.F.R. 243 (1979), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988).
97. Exec. Order No. 12,088, 3 C.F.R. 243 (1979), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988).
98. Environmental statutes typically delegate certain authority to the states. States must
meet minimum federal requirements and can implement programs that are more stringent than
federal requirements. For example, under the federal Clean Water Act, the federal industrial
waste water discharge program anticipates a gradual delegation of authority to states
demonstrating a capacity to administer their own programs, subject to a withdrawal of
authorization for state's programs which fall short of federal requirements. 2 WILLIAM H.
RODGERS, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAw § 4.26 (1986). Similarly, most state governments have
responsibilities for the management of solid waste. As Mr. Rodgers notes in his treatise, the
consequence presents, among other things, a conflict among environmental agencies. See 4
RODGERS, supra, § 7.22, at 254-55 (1992).
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facilities subject to both state RCRA and Federal CERCLA authority.
A recent U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit opinion, United
States v. Colorado,' addressed this issue in the context of a longstand-
ing dispute between the Department of the Army and the Colorado
Department of Health regarding cleanup of the Rocky Mountain
Arsenal, a federal facility in Denver, Colorado. The Federal Govern-
ment argued that CERCLA precluded the exercise of state RCRA
authority over ongoing Federal Superfund remedial actions.100 The
court disagreed, ruling that RCRA and CERCLA can be harmonized
and, when read together, reflected Congress' intent to permit states
broad authority to enforce their hazardous waste laws at federal
facilities, notwithstanding a CERCLA cleanup.'0 '
Consequently, under United States v. Colorado, a state with an
authorized hazardous waste program has authority to direct the
cleanup of environmental contamination at a TSD facility.' On
the other hand, under CERCLA, EPA has final authority to direct
cleanup of Superfund sites.10 As a result of these overlapping
authorities, government contractors performing cleanup activities at
federal facilities in states with authorized hazardous waste programs
may be subject to direct oversight by both EPA under CERCLA and
state environmental agencies under RCRA.
State common-law tort theories also may be a source of environ-
mental liability for government contractors. Under traditional
common-law theories, such as nuisance, trespass, and strict liability, a
contractor may be liable for damages and, in appropriate cases,
injunctive relief for injuries related to environmental contamina-
tion.10 4  Because these common-law theories have evolved almost
entirely as a matter of state law, the nature and scope of liability varies
considerably from state to state. 0 5 In cases where the Federal
99. 990 F.2d 1565 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 922 (1994).
100. United States v. Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1572, 1574, 1576 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. denied,
114 S. Ct. 922 (1994).
101. ad at 1579-84.
102. Id. at 1584.
103. 42 U.S.C. § 9621(a) (1988).
104. See generally DANIEL P. SELMI & KENNETH A. MANASTER, STATE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
§§ 2.01-4.05 (1993) (providing overview of role of common law in environmental law); FRANK
F. SKILLERN, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION §§ 1.13-.22 (1981) (discussing application of common
law to environmental problems). Under nuisance law, a substantial infringement on the use or
enjoyment of property may be remedied by damages or an injunction. SELMI & MANASTER,
supra, §§ 3.01-.07. Trespass offers a strategy similar to nuisance, but poses greater conceptual
difficulties because of its traditional reliance on a physical invasion of the property. Id.
§ 4.01 [1]. Strict liability may apply in cases involving abnormally dangerous or ultra-hazardous
activities, such as toxic waste disposal. Id. § 4.02[2].
105. See Caudill v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 999 F.2d 74, 79 (4th Cir. 1993) (noting
unfairness of applying state law to federal contract due to "vast differences in the common law
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Government successfully invokes sovereign immunity,0 6 common-
law claims by individuals may expose a government contractor to
liability far in excess of its proportionate share. Consequently, injured
parties who are precluded from bringing an action against the Federal
Government may turn to the contractors for compensation.'0 7
II. FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT INITIATIVES TARGET
GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS
Although environmentil laws generally apply to the Government,
constitutional and statutory limitations present significant roadblocks
when one federal agency, such as EPA or DOJ, brings an action for
violations of environmental laws against another federal agency, such
as DOD or DOE.0 8 State, local, and private-party environmental
enforcement efforts against the Federal Government also are impeded
by such limitations.10 9  As a result, environmental enforcement
efforts against federal agencies have not been particularly success-
ful.1 This Part discusses the various constitutional and statutory
limitations that have fueled the growth of environmental issues in
from state to state").
106. See Barry Breen, Federal Supremacy and Sovereign Immunity Waivers in Federal Environmental
Law, 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10326, 10327 (Oct. 1985) (discussing history of sovereign
immunity in sphere of environmental law); see also infra notes 126-53 and accompanying text
(discussing waivers of sovereign immunity by Federal Government in environmental protection
legislation).
107. SeeJim C. Chen & Kyle E. McSlarrow, Application of the Abnormally Dangerous Activities
Doctrine to Environmental Cleanups, 47 Bus. LAW. 1031, 1039-41 (1992) (discussing exposure of
government contractors to strict liability claims when Government asserts sovereign immunity
at facilities slated for sale or closure).
108. See infra notes 112-25, 141-63 and accompanying text (analyzing interagency
environmental enforcement in light of U.S. Constitution, Federal Facility Compliance Act, Anti-
Deficiency Act, and national defense considerations).
109. See infra notes 126-63 and accompanying text (evaluating efficacy of environmental
litigation against Federal Government considering constitutional and statutory provisions).
11b. 'For example, instead of issuing compliance orders to another federal agency for
environmental violations, EPA issues a"proposed order" or a "proposed Compliance Agreement"
and then must negotiate the terms of the order or Agreement with the agency. If agreement
is not reached, EPA typically must utilize internal dispute resolution mechanisms. If these
mechanisms do not work, then EPA must resort to the procedures established in Executive
Order 12,088, 3 C.F.R. 243 (1979), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988) (mandating federal
compliance with pollution control standards), and Executive Order 12,146,44 Fed. Reg. 42,658
(1979), repinted as amended in 28 U.S.C. § 509 (1988) (providing method for resolution of
interagency legal disputes). SeeCOMPLIANCE STRATEGY, supra note 5, atVI-4 to V-12 (describing
civil and administrative enforcement procedures for federal facilities). According to the
legislative history of the Federal Facility Compliance Act, "In the past several years the informal
dispute resolution process forced on EPA by challenges to its statutory authority has been
extremely ineffective and slow to resolve violations. Essentially the process involves jawboning
by the EPA at elevated bureaucratic levels." H.R. REP. No. 111, supra note 14, at 17, 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1303; see also id. at 3 (arguing that federal facilities have been slow to comply
and enforce RCRA and CERCLA).
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government contracting and that make it imperative for contractors
to protect themselves when performing federal contracts.
A. Constitutional Limitations
DOJ, which represents EPA in environmental enforcement
litigation, perceives interagency litigation as barred by the Constitu-
tion. DOJ takes the position that, because of prohibitions contained
in Articles II and III of the U.S. Constitution,"' federal courts are
not the proper forum for resolving disputes between federal executive
agencies." Rather, disputes between agencies "that serve at the
pleasure of the President" should be resolved internally. 3
DOJ bases its policy against interagency environmental litigation in
part on the President's constitutional authority and responsibility
under Article II to see that the laws of the United States are faithfully
executed..4 and a 1926 Supreme Court interpretation of Article
II.1" In Myers v. United States,"' the U.S. Supreme Court ad-
dressed executive power under Article II and first articulated the so-
called unitary executive theory. According to the Court in Myers, the
President has "general administrative control" over individuals with
delegated authority to execute the laws.117 The Court reasoned that
the basic principle underlying Article II of the Constitution is that the
executive power is vested in a single person, the President, who, as
head of the executive branch, must supervise and guide executive
officers in "their construction of the statutes under which they act in
order to secure . . . unitary and uniform execution of the laws."" 8 In
the view of DOJ, as a corollary to the obligation to supervise and
111. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; id. art. IH, § 2.
112. See Letter from Robert A- McConnell, former Assistant Attorney General, Office of
Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to Rep. John D. Dingell 1-2 (Oct. 11, 1983),
reprinted in COMPLIANCE STRATEGY, supra note 5, at app. H [hereinafter DOJ Letter] (explaining
DOJ's position on environmental enforcement actions and cleanup of federal facilities under
RCRA and CERCLA); see also Federal Environmental Compliance Hearing, supra note 5, at 182
(statement of F. Henry Habicht H1, Assistant Attorney General, Land and Natural Resources
Division, U.S. Department ofJustice) (expressing DOJ's policy on environmental compliance
and enforcement of federal facilities).
113. DOJ Letter, supra note 112, at 1-2.
114. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl.4.
115. See DOJ Letter, supra note 112, at 2-4 (explaining rationale for internal resolution of
executive agency disputes and describing process) (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52
(1926); Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792)).
116. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
117. Myers, 272 U.S. at 163-64.
118. Id. at 135 (emphasis added).
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guide executive officers, the President also must have the opportunity
to resolve disputes arising within the executive branch."1 9
DOJ also bases its policy against interagency environmental
litigation on Article III of the Constitution, which prohibits the
judiciary from hearing cases that lack justiciability.'2 ° According to
DOJ, EPA judicial enforcement actions against another federal
executive agency have only one real party in interest, the executive
branch.' Such enforcement actions, therefore, lack the "concrete
adverseness" required to meet the Article III case or controversy
requirement for federal court jurisdiction.1 22
DOJ believes that the constitutional infirmity with respect to
interagency lawsuits applies with equal force to unilateral administra-
tive orders issued by EPA against other federal executive agencies. 12
DOJ reasons that such orders are inconsistent with the constitutional
principles of unity and unitary responsibility within the executive
branch and that such orders, like lawsuits, interfere with presidential
management of the executive branch. 24  Accordingly, DOJ has
concluded that federal executive agencies cannot sue one another,
nor may one agency issue a compliance order against another agency
unless an internal executive branch dispute resolution process is not
available."z
119. See Federal Environmental Compliance Hearing, supra note 5, at 209 (statement of F. Henry
Habicht II, Assistant Attorney General, Land and Natural Resources Division, U.S. Department
ofJustice) ("[I]f the intentions of the Framers are to be fulfilled, the President must have an
unfettered opportunity to take action in the event of disagreements within the Executive
Branch.").
120. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. The Supreme Court has defined "justiciability" as follows:
[A] controversy ... distinguished from a difference or dispute of a hypothetical or
abstract character;, from one that is academic or moot. The controversy must be
'definite or concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal
interests. It must be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief
through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising
what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937) (citations omitted).
121. DOJ Letter, supra note 112, at 4.
122. DOJ Letter, supra note 112, at 4.
123. Federal Environmental Compliance Hearing, supra note 5, at 210-11 (statement ofF. Henry
Habicht II, Assistant Attorney General, Land and Natural Resources Division, U.S. Department
ofJustice).
124. Federal Environmental Compliance Hearing, supra note 5, at 210 (statement of F. Henry
Habicht II, Assistant Attorney General, Land and Natural Resources Division, U.S. Department
ofJustice).
125. Federal Environmental Compliance Hearing, supra note 5, at 29 (statement of F. Henry
Habicht II, Assistant Attorney General, Land and Natural Resources Division, U.S. Department
ofJustice). Executive Orders 12,146 and 12,088 provide a mechanism for federal agencies to
submit their disputes concerning compliance with environmental laws to the Attorney General
or the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, respectively. Under Executive Order
12,146, "Whenever two or more Executive agencies are unable to resolve a legal dispute between
them, . . . each agency is encouraged to submit the dispute to the Attorney General." Exec.
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It is generally undisputed that EPA has enforcement authority with
respect to environmental matters over other federal agencies. DOJ,
however, has taken the position that, as a result of the above-
mentioned constitutional limitations, EPA's authority does not extend
to filing actions in federal court or issuing unilateral compliance
orders against any federal agency. EPA, therefore, must negotiate and
coordinate environmental compliance issues with the other federal
agencies, an often time consuming and tedious process.
B. Statutory Limitations
1. Waivers of sovereign immunity
The constitutional limitations proscribing interagency litigation do
not, of course, apply to environmental litigation initiated by states or
private parties. Nonetheless, states or private parties seeking damages
or penalties from federal agencies for environmental contamination
must overcome the strict burden of proof imposed by courts in
determining whether the Federal Government has agreed, by statute,
to waive its sovereign immunity.'26
The doctrine of sovereign immunity is a seminal principle of
federal constitutional law.127 As a corollary to the Supremacy Clause
of the Constitution, 28 the Supreme Court has long held that "[i] t
is of the very essence of supremacy to remove all obstacles to [federal]
action within its own sphere."" It is thus well-settled that federal
installations and activities are shielded from regulation by the states,
unless there is a "clear and unambiguous" waiver of immunity in a
Order No. 12,146, 44 Fed. Reg. 42,658 (1979), rerinted as amended in 28 U.S.C. § 509 (1988).
Similarly, Executive Order 12,088 provides that "[the [EPA] Administrator shall make every
effort to resolve conflicts regarding [violations of pollution control standards) between Executive
agencies .... If the Administrator cannot resolve a conflict, the Administrator shall request the
Director of the Office of Management and Budget to resolve the conflict." Exec. Order No.
12,088, 3 C.F.R 245 (1979), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1988).
126. SeeUnited States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 1627, 1633 (1992) (noting that in
context of CWA and RCRA suit by Ohio against DOE, "any waiver of the National Government's
sovereign immunity must be unequivocal").
127. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 31 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(noting importance of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity in context of Superfund suit
against Pennsylvania); Exparle NewYork, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921) (prohibiting nonconsensual
suits against states based on fundamental constitutional rule of sovereign immunity); McCulloch
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 426 (1819) (denying states power to tax federal bank based
on implicit yet fundamental principle of sovereign immunity).
128. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2, cl. 2. The Supremacy Clause states, "This Constitution, and
the Laws of the United States... shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and thejudges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or the Laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding." Id.
129. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 427.
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particular statute." ° Furthermore, the Supreme Court has held that
any statutory waiver must be given a narrow construction by the
courts.
13 1
The extent to which a state may control federal facility activities is
thus determined by the sovereign immunity waiver provisions of the
environmental statute at issue. Each of the major federal environ-
mental laws contains provisions that make the statutory requirements
generally applicable to federal agencies and that purport to waive
sovereign immunity.13 The "clear and unambiguous" standard of
review imposed by the courts, however, may cloud the applicability of
federal and state environmental requirements to specific federal
activities.
For example, section 313(a) of the Clean Water Act contains a
typical waiver provision:
Each department, agency, or instrumentality of the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches of the Federal Government (1)
having jurisdiction over any property or facility, or (2) engaged in
any activity resulting, or which may result, in the discharge or
runoff of pollutants, and each officer, agent, or employee thereof
in the performance of his official duties, shall be subject to, and
comply with, all Federal, State, interstate, and local requirements,
administrative authority, and process and sanctions respecting the
control and abatement of water pollution in the same manner, and
to the same extent as any nongovernmental entity . ... The
preceding sentence shall apply (A) to any requirement whether
substantive or procedural .... (B) to the exercise of any Federal,
State, or local administrative authority, and (C) to any process and
sanction, whether enforced in Federal, State, or local courts or in
any other manner. This subsection shall apply notwithstanding any
immunity of such agencies, officers, agents, or employees under any
law or rule of law.'
130. Hancock v. Train, 426 U.S. 167, 179 (1976); see also EPA v. California ex rel. State Water
Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 211 (1976) ("Federal installations are subject to state
regulation only when and to the extent that congressional authorization is clear and unambigu-
ous.").
131. See Hancock 426 U.S. at 179-80 (explaining that congressional intent to submit federal
activity to state control cannot be implied).
132. Seesupra note 66 and accompanying text (listing environmental statutes and their waiver
of sovereign immunity provisions).
133. 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1988). Congressional amendments to § 313 in 1977 modified the
first quoted sentence and added the second and third sentences. CWA, Pub. L. No. 95-217, sec.
61(a), § 313, 91 Stat. 1566, 1598 (1977) (codified at 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a)). Prior to these
amendments, the Supreme Court had held that federal facilities were not subject to state NPDES
permit requirements because the CWA did not waive sovereign immunity with the requisite
degree of clarity. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. at 227-28.
1606
1994] ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACTING 1607
Notwithstanding this seemingly clear and broad waiver of sovereign
immunity, the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of
California, in McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation (MESS) v.
Weinberger,34 refused to construe section 313(a) as a complete waiver
of sovereign immunity.135 Under section 309(d) of the CWA, civil
penalties may be assessed against "[a]ny person who violates [certain
sections of the CWA] ... or any permit condition or limitation imple-
menting any of such sections."136 The court held that federal
agencies cannot be subjected to civil fines and penalties under the
CWA because such agencies are excluded from the definition of
"person" in section 502(5) of the CWA. 137  The court was not
persuaded by additional language in section 313(a) providing that
"the United States shall be liable only for those civil penalties arising
under Federal law or imposed by a State or local court to enforce an
order or the process of such court."3 ' According to the court in
MESS, the CWA federal facilities provision is a "compilation of
ambiguity" and, therefore, insufficient to constitute a waiver of
sovereign immunity with respect to civil fines and penalties.1 39
Despite court decisions challenging EPA's statutory authority over
federal facilities, Congress has become less tolerant of federal
agencies' efforts to hide behind the sovereign immunity curtain with
respect to environmental liabilities. In 1992, Congress passed and the
President signed the Federal Facility Compliance Acte4° to ensure
greater compliance by federal facilities with RCRA's requirements for
handling hazardous wastes.' 4 1 According to the legislative history of
the Act, the legislation reaffirms Congress' original intent that federal
134. 655 F. Supp. 601 (E.D. Cal. 1986). J
135. McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation (MESS) v. Weinberger, 655 F. Supp. 601,604-05
(E.D. Cal. 1986).
136. 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (1988) (emphasis added).
137. MESS, 655 F. Supp. at 605. Section 502(5) of the CWA defines the term "person" as
an "individual, corporation, partnership, association, State, municipality, commission, or political
subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." 33 U.S.C. § 1362(5).
138. MESS, 655 F. Supp. at 604.
139. Id. The Supreme Court has found CWA and RCRA provisions insufficient to constitute
a waiver of sovereign immunity. In United States Department of Energy v. Ohio, 112 S. Ct. 1627
(1992), the Court concluded that "neither statute [CWA or RCRA] defines 'person' to include
the United States... a fact that renders the civil penalties sections inapplicable to the United
States." Id. at 1634-35. This case was decided before Congress enacted the Federal Facility
Compliance Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-386, 106 Stat. 1505 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1992)), which amended the definition of"person" under RCRA
to waive sovereign immunity with respect to civil fines and penalties for federal facility hazardous
waste violations. 42 U.S.C. § 6903(15) (Supp. IV 1992).
140. Pub. L No. 102-386, 106 Stat. 1505 (1992) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C. (Supp. IV 1992)).
141. H.R. REP. No. 111, supra note 14, at 2, 1992 U.S.C.CA.N. at 1288.
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agencies are to be treated as "persons" under RCRA.14 1 Moreover,
the Act explicitly provides that federal facilities are subject to the
same substantive and procedural requirements, including enforce-
ment sanctions, as state and local governments and private compa-
nies.14 In essence, the Act purports to place federal agencies on an
equal footing with private parties.' 44 In that regard, EPA now has
discretionary authority to initiate an administrative enforcement
action against a federal facility in the same manner and under the
same circumstances as it would initiate an action against a private
party.145 Thus, federal agencies that refuse to resolve hazardous waste
violations in a timely manner will be subject to appropriate sanc-
tions. 146
In addition, the Federal Facility Compliance Act requires EPA to
conduct annual hazardous waste inspections of federal facilities." 7
States with approved RCRA programs can also conduct such inspec-
tions.' The federal department, agency, or instrumentality owning
or operating the facility is required to reimburse EPA or the autho-
rized state for the cost of conducting the assessment.1 49
The Act also requires DOE, not later than 180 days after enactment
of the Act, to conduct a national inventory, on a state-by-state basis,
of mixed waste 50 at each DOE facility.' For each facility where
mixed waste is stored or generated, DOE is required to prepare a
plan for developing treatment capacity and technologies for handling
such mixed waste, regardless of when the waste was generated.'52
Additionally, DOE is required to include a compliance schedule in
the plan, and submit annual progress reports to Congress. 53
142. Id.
143. 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (a) (Supp. IV 1992).
144. H.R. REP. No. 111, supra note 14, at 2, 1992 U.S.C.CA.N. at 1288 (quoting former
President Bush's acknowledgement that government agencies arc among worst environmental
offenders and that "government should live with the laws it imposes on others").
145. 42 U.S.C. § 6961(b)(1).
146. Id. § 6928 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); see H.R. REP. No. 111, supra note 14, at 15, 1992
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1301 (stating Energy and Commerce Committee's intent to reaffirm that federal
facilities are subject to enforcement penalties).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 6927(c) (Supp. IV 1992).
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. See id. § 6903(41) (defining "mixed waste" as waste containing "both hazardous waste
and source, special nuclear, or by-product material").
151. Id. § 6939c(a)(1).
152. Id. § 6939c(b).
153. Id. § 6939c(c).
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2. The Anti-Deficiency Act and other constraints
Even though Congress may waive sovereign immunity with respect
to civil penalties and fines assessed against federal agencies under
certain environmental statutes, such penalties might run afoul of the
Anti-Deficiency Act."5 4 The Anti-Deficiency Act prohibits federal
agency officials from obligating the United States to spend money that
has not been appropriated by Congress."' EPA recognized this
potential roadblock to enforcement in its recently adopted policy
implementing the Federal Facility Compliance Act. 56 According to
EPA, "unique payment issues [might] arise with regard to payment of
penalties by such agencies. ""' EPA policy provides that if the
federal agency demonstrates that it cannot pay a penalty because of
the Anti-Deficiency Act, the agency should be required to agree to
request additional funds from Congress.5 8
Additional factors may contribute to the EPA's inability to collect
penalties from federal agencies. Even if federal agencies rank
pollution control as a high priority, facility managers and agency
administrators still must weigh the costs of environmental compliance
against budget constraints, production goals, and other priorities.'
A lack of funding, however, generally does not excuse a federal
agency from complying with a statutory obligation." Moreover, the
154. Anti-Deficiency Act, ch. 510, 34 Stat. 49 (1906) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 31 U.S.C. (1988 & Supp. V 1993)).
155. 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
156. Federal Facility Compliance Act: Enforcement Authorities Implementation, 58 Fed.
Reg. 49,044 (1993) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 22).
157. Id. at 49,045-46 n.5; see also COMPLIANCE STRATEGY, supra note 5, at VI-13 ("EPA
recognizes that the Anti-DeficiencyAct prohibits federal officials from committing funds beyond
those they are authorized to spend.").
158. COMPLIANCE STRATEGY, supra note 5, at VI-13. In the legislative history to the Federal
Facility Compliance Act, Congress stated that the system for paying civil penalties under the
Clean Air Act should be equally applicable to hazardous waste violations. H.R. REP. No. 111,
supra note 14, at 15-16, 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 1301. The source of payment for penalties was
described in a formal opinion issued by the Comptroller General on July 19, 1979. Id. With
respect to air quality penalties, the Comptroller General ruled that "if the federal agency
concedes liability and agrees to pay the penalty administratively assessed, then a penalty is
payable from the agency's appropriation, assuming that the penalty was incurred in the course
of conducting activities necessary and proper or incidental to fulfilling the purpose for which
the appropriation was made." Id. If the agency disputes the penalty, then a compromise
settlement or judgment is payable from "the permanent indefinite 'judgment fund'
appropriation by Congress (31 U.S.C. § 1304)." Id.
159. RAMI S. HANASH, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILnYOF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS 21-22 (BNA
Corporate Practice Series 1992).
160. See New York Airways v. United States, 369 F.2d 743, 748 (Ct. CI. 1966) ("It has long
been established that the mere failure of Congress to appropriate funds without further words
modifying or repealing, expressly or by clear implication, the substantive law, does not in and
of itself defeat a Government obligation created by statute."); see also Will v. United States, 478
F. Supp. 621, 629-30 (1979) (applying New York Airways and holding that failure to appropriate
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environmental statutes preclude lack of funding alone as a reason for
noncompliance by a federal agency.6 1
Fiscal considerations aside, an agency may be able to escape compli-
ance altogether. In certain limited circumstances, such as where
compliance will impair national defense measures, the President may
grant an exemption from statutory environmental requirements.162
The President has used this exemption power only once.' 63
C. Impact on Government Contractors
As a result of the constitutional and statutory roadblocks that bar
or impede environmental enforcement actions against federal
agencies, government contractors stand out as prominent targets for
EPA, DOJ, states, and private parties attempting to enforce environ-
mental cleanup laws or recover for environmental cleanup liabilities
at federal facilities.1' Moreover, because of the Federal
Government's involvement, 'these cases receive substantial public
exposure as well as congressional attention." With the increasing
public awareness of federal facility environmental contamination
problems, the likelihood of government contractors being targeted
grows as the full extent of the problems at DOD and DOE facilities
becomes known.
EPA and DOJ both readily acknowledge that the constitutional and
statutory limitations applicable to federal agencies do not bar or
funds did not preclude federal district court judges from recovering compensation due them
under Adjustment Act).
161. CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a); RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (a) (Supp. IV 1992);CAA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7418(b) (Supp. IV 1992).
162. See RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6961 (1988). Section 6961 provides:
The President may exempt any solid waste management facility of any department,
agency, or instrumentality in the executive branch from compliance with such
[hazardous waste] requirement if he determines it to be in the paramount interest of
the United States to do so. No such exemption shall be granted due to lack of
appropriation ....
Id.; see also CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1988) (presidential exemption provision); CAA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7418(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (presidential exemption provision).
163. See Exec. Order No. 12,244, 45 Fed. Reg. 66,443 (1980), reprinted in 22 U.S.C. § 2601
(1988) (exempting FortAllen from requirements of CAA, Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
Solid Waste Disposal Act, and Noise Control Act in order to effectuate immediate relocation and
temporary housing of Haitian and Cuban nationals).
164. See HAaSH, supra note 159, at 25 (stating that government contractors have always been
exposed to liability claims by those who cannot get compensation from government because of
sovereign immunity); see also Robert T. Lee & Scott E. Slaughter, Government Contractors and
EnvironmentalLitigation, [Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 2138 (Feb. 10, 1989) (noting
EPA's October 1988 announcement that environmental enforcement actions would begin
against government contractors).
165. See Lee & Slaughter, supra note 164, at 2138 (describing public anger at expenditure
of tax dollars on environmentally damaging contracts and noting congressional focus on
facilities under congressional oversight).
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impede environmental, enforcement efforts against government
contractors. In congressional testimony, then-Assistant Attorney
General F. Henry Habicht II explained that "practical realities require
that we recognize these inherent distinctions between private entities
and federal agencies."166 With respect to government contractors,
DOJ affirmed that it intended to use the "full panoply of its judicial
enforcement tools" against GOCO violators that are operating on
federal facilities. 7
Similarly, EPA's Compliance Strategy clearly states EPA's intention "to
exercise its full authority to bring civil suits and assess civil penalties,
as appropriate, against [private] parties."1" EPA's policy with
respect to government contractors was further delineated in a 1988
interagency memorandum, which recommended that EPA exercise all
enforcement authorities available under RCRA and CERCLA for non-
federal facility actions when a contractor is the primary operator at a
federal facility.169 Moreover, the memorandum recognized the
value of proceeding against GOCOs, especially at facilities where
contractors perform the bulk of the waste management work. 7 '
Although EPA specifically addressed GOCO facilities, it is reasonable
to assume that EPA would employ the same rationale with respect to
enforcement actions involving cleanup contractors and others. Thus,
government contractors are in a unique and unenviable position with
respect to alleged environmental violations or liabilities at GOCO
facilities, or in any other situation where the contractor is performing
services under contract with the Federal Government.
Congress recognizes the dilemma facing government contractors
with respect to tort and statutory liability, but has been unable to
fashion a legislative solution. For example, the proposed Government
166. Federal Environmental Compliance Hearing; supra note 5, at 188 (statement of F. Henry
Habicht II, Assistant Attorney General, Land and Natural Resources Division, U.S. Department
ofJustice).
167. Federal Environmental Compliance Hearing; supra note 5, at 216 (statement of F. Henry
Habicht II, Assistant Attorney General, Land and Natural Resources Division, U.S. Department
ofJustice).
168. COMPLIANCE STRATEGY, supra note 5, at VI-14. As a result of the Federal Facility
Compliance Act of 1992, however, EPA issued a new policy that, with respect to RCRA
enforcement, amends the 1988 Compliance Strategy. EnforcementAuthorities Implementation,
58 Fed. Reg. 49,044 (1993). Under the Act and new implementing policy, EPA will issue
administrative compliance orders to federal facilities for RCRA violations and, in appropriate
circumstances, assess civil and administrative penalties and fines. Id. at 49,044-45.
169. Memorandum from J. Winston Porter, Assistant Administrator, Office of Solid Waste
and Emergency Response, EPA, to EPA Regional Administrators 4 Uan. 25, 1988) (on file with
The American University Law Review).
170. Id.
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Contractor Liability Reform Act of 1986'' recognized that govern-
ment contractors have "encountered a rapid expansion in their tort
liability which seriously interferes with the contractors' ability to
provide many of the goods and services required by the United
States." '172 The proposal further recognized that the problem of
liability is most acute with respect to federal programs designed to
protect public health and safety in situations in which contractor
liability was not based on fault.73 Accordingly, the Act would have
established a system of government contractor liability based on a
negligence standard. 74
While Congress has failed to pass legislation that directly addresses
government contractor liability, the Federal Facility Compliance
Act'7 may take some of the focus off government contractors for
hazardous waste violations. In March 1993, the Washington Depart-
ment of Ecology assessed $100,000 in fines and issued a compliance
order jointly against DOE and DOE's operating contractor, Westing-
house Hanford Co., for hazardous waste violations at the Hanford
Nuclear facility. 76 The fines were imposed under authority from
the Federal Facilities Compliance Act, which provides states with
"explicit authority to enforce hazardous waste laws at federal
facilities." 177 According to the state, the fine and order were issued
jointly because DOE is the "owner" of the facility and is ultimately
responsible for its activities, and Westinghouse, as the facility operator,
is under a duty to operate in compliance with state and federal
environmental laws.' 78 Prior to the Federal Facilities Compliance
Act, the fine and order likely would have been issued only against the
government contractor.
III. THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACTOR DEFENSE AND OTHER SHIELDS
TO LIABILITY
Government contractors cannot look to sovereign immunity to
shield them from environmental liabilities. Although the "govern-
171. S. 2441, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986); see also H.R. 2378, 100th Cong., Ist Sess. (1987)
(indemnifying government contractors from civil liability in certain circumstances); H.R. 4765,
99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (placing limitations on civil liability of government contractors).
172. S. 2441, supra note 171, § 2.
173. S. 2441, supra note 171, § 2.
174. S. 2441, supra note 171, § 5(a).
175. See supra notes 141-53 and accompanying text (discussing provisions of Federal Facility
Compliance Act that make agencies liable for environmental violations).
176. Washington Fines DOE, Westinghouse Under New Federal Compliance Statute, 23 Env't Rep.
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ment contractor defense" 179 may provide some protection in this
regard, typically this defense is used successfully only against tort and
product liability claims."' 0 The viability of the government contrac-
tor defense has not been directly addressed in the context of statutory
environmental compliance requirements or cleanup liability cases.
Nevertheless, alternative defenses may be available to government
contractors facing environmental enforcement litigation. Other
potential liability shields include the government-furnished property
defense,18 ' the principal-agent doctrine,8 2 the real-party-in-interest
defense, 8 3 and protections afforded by certain provisions of the
Defense Production Act.'I 4 This Part addresses the most promising
defenses and their potential applicability to contractors performing
services for the Federal Government.
179. The government contractor defense operates on a theory of shared immunity and may
insulate contractors from environmental tort liability by bringing them beneath the
Government's umbrella of sovereign immunity. HANASH, supra note 159, at 54.
180. See, e.g., Nielsen v. George Diamond Vogel Paint Co., 892 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir.
1990) (citing historical use of defense in cases where military personnel sued military contractors
in product liability cases); Bynum v. FMC Corp., 770 F.2d 556, 567 (5th Cir. 1985) (providing
that basis for government contractor defense in products liability action lies in federal common
law); Brown v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 696 F.2d 246, 252 (3d Cir. 1982) (holding government
contractor defense is available in strict liability cases).
181. This defense is applicable in situations where the contract contains a "government
property clause," a provision allowing the Government to retain title to all property it furnishes
a contractor. HANASH, supra note 157, at 38. This clause may allow the contractor to impute
liability to the Government for CERCLA and RCRA costs. Id.; see also infra notes 212-23 and
accompanying text (explaining nature of government-furnished property defense).
182. See Shaw v. Grumman AeroSpace Corp., 778 F.2d 736, 739 (11th Cir. 1985) (allowing
contracting agent to share Government's immunity when agency relationship is established).
The court in Shaw described a three-part analysis used to determine whether the contractor
could share the Government's immunity: (1) was the Government immune; (2) was the
contractor an agent under the agency doctrine; and (3) did the contractor, as an agent, act
within the scope of its duties. Id. at 740.
Generally, courts are reluctant to construe the relationship between the Government and the
contractor as an agency relationship. HANASH, supra note 159, at 37. If the agency relationship
is established, however, the defense would not be limited to tort liability actions and could be
used in the context of environmental liability. Id. at 37-38.
183. See FED. R CIv. P. 17(a) (requiring that "every action shall be prosecuted in the name
of the real party of interest"). To establish that the government agency is the real party in
interest, the contractor must show that the agency shares the duty to comply with environmental
regulations and that the result of the litigation will affect it. HANASH, supra note 159, at 41.
184. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2061-2170 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). The Defense Production Act
authorizes the President to order government contractors to perform a government contract
before fulfilling its obligations to other customers. Id. § 2071. In return, contractors are
protected from liability that results from compliance with the Act. Id. § 2157. One
commentator argues that this protection could be extended to cover environmental liabilities.
HANASH, supra note 157, at 27-28. In support of this argument, Hanash notes that the language
of the Act was broadened in 1952 to include liability protection for "any act or failure to act."
Id. at 28.
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A. Government Contractor Defense
Traditionally, the government contractor defense was successful
only in product liability actions against military contractors for injuries
resulting from product design defects. 85 In Boyle v. United Technol-
ogies Corp.,186 however, the Supreme Court expanded this defense to
prohibit actions against government contractors that would affect
"uniquely federal interests" and infringe on discretionary functions of
federal agencies. 8
7
The Court, comparing the civil liability of a government contractor
to that of a federal official who is protected from liability for actions
taken in the course of official duties, fashioned a three-part test for
determining whether a government contractor would be immunized
from liability:88 (1) "the United States approved reasonably precise
specifications,"'89 (2) "the equipment conformed to those specifica-
tions," 9 ' and (3) "the supplier warned the United States about the
dangers in the use of the equipment that were known to the supplier
but not to the United States."'9 ' The Court also noted that the
government contractor defense was applicable not only to procure-
ment contracts, but to other types of contracts as well, including
service contracts.19
2
Although the Court's rationale in Boyle appears applicable to civil
liability claims based on violations of environmental statutes, the
185. See supra note 180 (discussing application of government contractor defense in product
liability cases).
186. 487 U.S. 500 (1988).
187. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 504, 511-12 (1988). The Court looked
to the "discretionary function" exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). Id. at 511.
Under the FTCA, Congress authorized the recovery of damages against the United States for
injuries caused by the negligent or wrongful conduct of government employees, to the extent
that a private person would be liable under applicable state law. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988).
This waiver of sovereign immunity did not apply, however, to situations where a federal agency
or government employee exercised or failed to exercise a discretionary function or duty. Id.
§ 2680(a).
188. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. Id. The Court in Boye relied heavily on Yearslky v. WA. Ross Construction Co., which held
that a government contractor, who was an agent of the Government, could not be held liable
for property damage under state law because the authority to carry out the project had been
validly conferred. Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18, 20-21 (1940).
192. Boy/e, 487 U.S. at 506; see also Carley v. Wheeled Coach, 991 F.2d 1117, 1125 (3d Cir.
1993) (holding that government contractor defense is available to non-military contractors).
The court in Carey reasoned that, under Boye, private contractors should not be denied
extension of sovereign immunity merely because they are not engaged in military procurement.
C, rey, 991 F.2d at 1124. The court noted, however, that there is a split of authority on this
issue. See i. at 1119 n.1 (listing cases that have extended defense to non-military contractors
and cases that rejected that application).
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defense is unlikely to immunize contractors from state or federal
environmental enforcement actions where Congress has waived
sovereign immunity and has required the Federal Government to
comply with environmental statutes and regulations.'93 Under Boyle,
the government contractor defense is based on the Federal
Government's decisionmaking discretion.194 Thus, in situations
where Congress waives sovereign immunity and compels federal
agencies to comply with environmental laws, the agency no longer has
the discretion to decide whether or not it should comply.9 Even
in cases where Congress has not waived sovereign immunity, a federal
agency's own regulations or an executive order may remove discre-
tionary authority.196
For example, in Crawford v. National Lead Co.,' 7 - the Federal
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio held that the govern-
ment contractor defense did not immunize DOE and its contract-
operator from tort liability resulting from environmental law viola-
tions.1 98 The court conceded that the operation of a nuclear
weapons plant was a uniquely federal interest.1 99  The court
determined, however, that if such operations violate applicable
environmental laws..0 and, as a result, give rise to state-law tort




Commentators suggest that the government contractor defense may
be applicable in circumstances where there is no congressional waiver
of sovereign immunity and the federal agency is not bound by its own
regulations or an executive order.0 2  The applicability of the
193. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text (noting that generally, federal
environmental statutes contain waiver of sovereign immunity provisions and require Federal
Government to comply with federal, state, and local environmental laws to same extent as any
other person).
194. Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511.
195. See HANASH, supra note 159, at 58 (noting that waiver of sovereign immunity removes
compliance with environmental regulations from scope of discretionary decisionmaking).
196. See Clark v. United States, 660 F. Supp. 1164, 1176 (W.D. Wash. 1987) (holding that
exemption from liability based on discretionary function does not apply when agency fails to
comply with its own regulations); see also Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988)
(noting that discretion is absent where federal regulation, statute, or policy prescribes cause of
action).
197. 784 F. Supp. 439 (S.D. Ohio 1989).
198. Crawford v. National Lead Co., 784 F. Supp. 439, 447 (S.D. Ohio 1989).
199. Id. at 446.
200. The facility violated the Refuse Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1988), and the Atomic
Energy Commission's regulations for maximum permissible releases of radioactive material.
Crawford, 784 F. Supp. at 447.
201. Crawford, 784 F. Supp. at 447.
202. See HANASH, supra note 159, at 59 (contending that "Boyle demonstrates a judicial
recognition that under certain circumstances a contractor may be exposed to liability out of
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defense will depend on whether the contractor acted pursuant to
explicit agency instructions with respect to an important federal
interest and notified the agency of potential environmental viola-
tions. °3 In a recent case, Lamb v. Martin Marietta Energy Systems,
Inc.,2 a federal district court addressed the potential applicability
of the government contractor defense to a contractor's alleged
violations of environmental laws in the operation of a government-
owned nuclear production facility. °5 In Lamb, the contractor was
responsible for the daily operation of the plant, but was required to
follow DOE's directions and instructions while DOE maintained close
supervision over the contractor's work. 06
Although the court in Lamb upheld the validity of the government
contractor defense in the context of environmental violations,20 7 it
refused to grant the defendants' motion for summaryjudgment based
on the defense.08 According to the court, the defendants failed to
show that DOE oversight involved a discretionary policy judg-
ment. 2° If DOE officials were merely following a course of action
prescribed by a federal statute, regulation, or policy, then the action
would not be considered discretionary.21 0  In addition, the defen-
dants in Lamb failed to show that contractor personnel faithfully
adhered to DOE's orders.211  Finally, the court questioned whether
the contractor promptly notified DOE of the environmental prob-
lem. 212
The most likely application of the government contractor defense
in the environmental area will be in defending common-law tort
actions for environmental injuries where harm has occurred as a
necessity, and that the government may be so closely connected to the violation that the
contractor's actions should be equated to those of the government"); Lee & Slaughter, supra
note 164, at 2139 (arguing that defense should be applicable where environmental injury occurs
as result of contractor's compliance with discretionary decisions offederal officials); cf Goodyear
Atomic Corp. v. Miller, 486 U.S. 174, 180-81 (1988) (finding that federally owned facility
performing federal function is shielded from direct state regulation, even when federal function
is carried out by private contractor, unless Congress clearly authorizes such regulation).
203. HANASH, supra note 159, at 59.
204. 835 F. Supp. 959 (W.D. Ky. 1993).
205. Lamb v. Martin Marietta Energy Sys., Inc., 835 F. Supp. 959, 965-66 (W.D. Ky. 1993).
206. Id. at 966.
207. See id. (holding that defense may be applied to case at bar).
208. I& at 968 (rejecting summary judgment motion because defendants failed to establish
that they followed DOE's orders and that DOE's orders fell within discretionary function of
Federal Government).
209. Id.
210. 1& at 967.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 968.
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result of the contractor's actions that are based on the decisions of
federal officials."13
B. Government Property Defense
If environmental liabilities arise from hazardous substances
furnished or otherwise owned by the Federal Government, the
contractor may establish that the Federal Government is responsible
for all or a major portion of those liabilities. An early Court of
Claims decision held that the Government is the owner of all
materials supplied to a contractor, regardless of their current form,
including scrap and waste.2 14 In addition, virtually all government
contracts now contain an explicit clause providing that the Govern-
ment retains title to all government-furnished property.1 5 This is
a far reaching clause because the Federal Acquisition Regulations
(FAR) 216 define the term "property" to incorporate "all property,
both real and personal,"217 including that which "may be incorporat-
ed into or attached to a deliverable end item or that may be
consumed or expended in performing a contract."21 8
At least two courts, in decisions not involving government contracts,
have held a manufacturer that provided raw materials to an indepen-
dent contractor liable for cleanup costs under CERCLA for improper
waste disposal.2 19  For example, in United States v. Aceto Agricultural
213. Lee & Slaughter, supra note 164, at 2139.
214. See National Metal Moulding Co. v. United States, 76 Ct. Cl. 194, 199-201 (1932)
(concluding that Government continued to own materials supplied to manufacturer where
materials were to be returned to Government, albeit in processed form).
215. See, e.g., 48 C.FR. § 52.245-2(c) (1993) (setting forth model government contract
provision for fixed-price contract); id. § 52.245-4(b) (providing model government contract
provision for short form contract); id. § 52.245-5 (presenting model government contract
provision for cost-reimbursement, time and material, and labor contracts). The model contracts
also provide that the Government retains title to certain contractor-acquired property. See, e.g.,
id. § 52.245-2(c) (4) (assigning title to Government in model fixed-price contract if contractor
is required to purchase material and obtain reimbursement from Government as direct item of
cost); id. § 52.245-5(e) (3) (assigning title to Government in model cost-reimbursement, time and
material, and labor contracts for property purchased by contractor when Government
reimburses contractor).
216. 48 C.F.R ch. 1. The FAR is intended to both codify and make uniform the acquisition
policies of the executive branch. W. NOEL KEYES, GOVERNMENT CONTRAGrS UNDER THE FEDERAL
AcQusrroN REGULATION § 1.2, at 4 (1986). The FAR applies to all acquisitions that are not
expressly excluded from its scope. Id. at 5. It is issued and maintained under the auspices of
DOD, the General Services Administration, and NASA. Id. at 4-5.
217. 48 C.F.R. § 45.101 (a).
218. Id. § 45.301. This is the FAR definition of the term "material," which is included within
the regulatory definition of "property." Id. § 45.101 (a).
219. See United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Co., 872 F.2d 1373, 1379-82 (8th Cir. 1989)
(applying 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 413, 416, 427,
427A (1965) to hold that pesticide manufacturer may be liable for cleanup costs arising from
contractor activities); United States v. Velsicol Chem., 701 F. Supp. 140, 142-43 (W.D. Tenn.
1987) (applying 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(29), 9607 (1982) to hold that manufacturer that provided
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Chemical,2 ° a manufacturer furnished a pesticide, a hazardous raw
material, to an independent contractor for formulation into a final
product and packaging.22' While the manufacturer retained owner-
ship of the pesticide throughout the formulation process, 222 the
contractor's activities resulted in soil contamination at the facility.223
Applying section 107(a) of CERCLA,224 the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit held that the manufacturer may be responsible
for the cost of cleaning up the contamination because the manufac-
turer owned the hazardous waste at the time of disposal.225 Apply-
ing the court's rationale in the government contracts context, when
the government furnishes or otherwise retains ownership of materials,
the contractor may be able to shift all or'a portion of its environmen-
tal liabilities to the contracting federal agency.
C. Defense Production Act
Under the Defense Production Act (DPA)," 6 the President has
the authority to issue "rated order" contracts227 that compel contrac-
tors to give priority to the performance of any government contracts
or orders deemed necessary or appropriate to promote the national
defense." The DPA further provides that contractors acting under
this provision will not be held liable "for damages or penalties for any
act or failure to act resulting directly or indirectly from compliance
with a rule, regulation, or order issued pursuant to this Act."229 The
few courts that have interpreted this immunity provision concluded
that the DPA does not provide the government contractor with an
implied-in-fact contractual indemnification.30
pesticides may be liable for CERCILA cleanup costs).
220. 872 F.2d 1373 (8th Cir. 1989).
221. United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Co., 872 F.2d 1373, 1375 (8th Cir. 1989).
222. Id. at 1381.
223. Id. at 1376.
224. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1982).
225. Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1379-82. The court also relied on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTs § 427A (1965). Aceto, 872 F.2d at 1379, 1382. The relevant provision states: "One who
employs an independent contractor to do work which the employer knows or has reason to
know to involve an abnormally dangerous activity, is subject to liability to the same extent as the
contractor for physical harm to others caused by the activity." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 427A (1965).
226. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2061-2170 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
227. See United States v. General Dynamics, CA No. 4-87-312k, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17256,
at *7 n.8 (N.D. Tex.June 9, 1988) (applying "rated order" label to contracts and orders issued
under 50 U.S.C. app. § 2071 (1988)).
228. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2071 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Employment contracts are exempted
from the scope of § 2071. Id.
229. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2157 (1988).
230. See, e.g., Win. T. Thompson Co. v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 17, 28-30 (1992) (holding
§ 2157 of DPA does not indemnify plaintiff, but only provides government contractor with
1618
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The federal district court in United States v. General Dynamics
Corp.231 addressed the potential applicability of the DPA to violations
of environmental laws. In that case, the Government filed suit against
General Dynamics, the operator of an Air Force plant, alleging
violations of the Clean Air Act.1 2  The alleged environmental
violations resulted from the use of materials specified in General
Dynamics' "rated order" contract with the Air Force.233
In response to the government's claims, General Dynamics argued
that the DPA immunizes defense contractors with rated order
contracts from liability under the CAA.2 ' The court disagreed,
reasoning that neither the language nor the legislative history of the
DPA exempted defense contractors from liability.23 In addition,
the court explained that such an interpretation would allow defense
contractors to "violate the Clean Air Act with impunity, as long as
[they] were attempting to fulfill and comply with their respective
contracts."2 36 The court also noted that the CAA requires federal
agencies to comply with federal, state, and local air quality laws.
237
Therefore, it would be inconsistent to exempt defense contractors
working for federal agencies from CAA requirements.
28
The district court in In re Agent Orange, 9 however, suggested that
product liability immunity may apply to strict liability claims because
the defendant is liable "despite the fact that it may not have been at
fault and the liability thus truly 'result[s] ... from compliance with
... this Act."'2 40 Based on In re Agent Orange, government contrac-
tors performing work pursuant to rated order contracts may be able
defense). Cf. In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 845 (E.D.N.Y. 1984)
(concluding that § 2157 of DPA indemnifies only damages due to contract reprioritization under
§ 2071, not "the risk of injuries to those using or exposed to the contractor's product").
231. CA No. 4-87-312, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17256 (N.D. Tex.June 9, 1988).
232. United States v. General Dynamics, CA No. 4-87-312, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17256, at
*1 (N.D. Tex. June 9, 1988) (applying 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982)). The suit was filed by
DOJ on behalf of EPA. Id. The Government sought injunctive relief to halt the use of certain
coatings and civil penalties for each day of violation of a five-year period. I&
233. Id. at *8 (noting General Dynamics' defense that terms of its contract could not be
modified without Air Force permission).
234. Id. at *7. General Dynamics also argued that the court could not rule on the suit, which
was in effect a suit by the Federal Government (specifically the EPA) against itself (specifically
the Air Force). Id. at *7-8. The court rejected this defense because the alleged Clean Air Act
violations stemmed directly from General Dynamics' corporate decision not to install emission
controls. Id. at "9.
235. Id. at *11-12.
236. Id. at *11.
237. Id. at *12.
238. Id.
239. 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
240. In Re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 845 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (quoting
50 U.S.C. app. § 2157 (1982)).
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to claim immunity under the DPA from the strict liability provisions
of CERCLA or RCRA. According to the court's decision in General
Dynamics, however, any such immunity would likely exist only if the
contractor was complying with applicable environmental laws.
IV. CoNTRACTuAL AGREEMENTS AND PROTECTIONS FOR MINIMIZING
CONTRACTORS' ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITIES
One reason for the growth of environmental issues in government
contracting is the lack of specific defenses that government contrac-
tors can rely on in the event that an environmental enforcement
action is brought against them for statutory violations. Although the
defenses discussed above may apply in limited situations, most
defenses initially were intended to address tort liabilities, not statutory
violations. As a result, government contractors seeking to minimize
potential environmental liabilities generally must rely on contractual
agreements.
Currently, both Congress and the regulated community are
addressing the extent to which the Federal Government should
reimburse or indemnify government contractors for environmental
liabilities. 4' Ironically, when determining whether to bring an
environmental enforcement action, DOJ does not consider the extent
of contractor indemnification by and, therefore, reimbursement from
the Federal Government for any 'esulting liabilities.24
2
This Part examines the different types of government contracts,
addresses issues relating to indemnification of government contrac-
tors, and identifies special issues for environmental cleanup contrac-
tors.
241. See Dingell Says DOE Offers Contractors Too Much Liability Protection, ENVrL. POL'Y ALERT,
Sept. 15, 1993, at 5, 5 (noting that "[m] embers of Congress have... battled" over indemnifica-
tion of contractor's environmental cleanup costs); Industry Callsfor Negligence Standard, Limits on
Liability for Cleanup Work, 57 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 830,830 (June 1, 1992) (describing position
paper endorsed by 13 industry groups and over 40 individual contractors that requests DOD
assign environmental liabilities based on negligence rather than strict liability).
242. See Federal Environmental Compliance Hearings, supra note 5, at 215 (statement ofF. Henry
Habicht II, Assistant Attorney General, Land and Natural Resources Division, U.S. Department
ofJustice). Assistant Attorney General Habicht stated:
Let me say frankly that [contractual provisions concerning indemnity] are not ofdirect
concern to my priorities in enforcing environmental laws.... When a federal agency
is sued, or the contractor of any agency is sued, the contractual and/or indemnity
relationship is not a major factor in assessing the environmental case.
1620
1994] ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACrING 1621
A. Primary Types of Government Contracts
The contractor's ability to recover environmental cleanup costs
from the Government will depend primarily on the nature of the
contractual arrangement between the contractor and the federal
agency. The two primary types of contracts used by federal agencies
are the cost-reimbursement contract and the fixed-price contract.243
Contractors operating federal facilities, GOCOs, typically operate
under a cost-reimbursement type contract.244 DOE, however, is
increasing its use of fixed-price contracts for environmental restora-
tion projects.245 Thus, the type of contract may significantly affect
the allocation of risk between the contractor and the federal agency.
1. Cost-reimbursement contracts
Under a cost-reimbursement contract, the Government compen-
sates the contractor through reimbursement for necessary expenses
and some forn of additional fee.246 The contract contemplates that
243. RALPH C. NASH,JR. & STEVEN L SCHOONER, THE GOVERNMENT CONTRAC=S REFERENCE
BOOK 405 (1992). Other types of government contracts considered in the FARinclude incentive
contracts, 48 C.FR. §§ 16.401-16.405 (1993), indefinite-delivery contracts, id. §§ 16.501-16.506,
and time-and-materials, labor-hour, and letter contracts, id. §§ 16.601-16.603-4.
244. SeeMerkJ. O'Connor, Government Owned-Contractor Operated MunitionsFacilites: Are They
Appropriate in the Age ofStrict Environmental Compliance and Liability, 131 MIL. L REV. 1, 12 (1991)
(explaining that Army GOCO facilities are normally operated under cost-reimbursement
contracts because environmental liability is too unpredictable to include in fixed-price
contracts).
245. See HWAC Urges DOE to Contract Directly for Environmental Restoration Projects, BypassingM
& 0, 60 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 289, 290 (Sept. 27, 1993) [hereinafter HWAC Urges DOE]
(positing that DOE employees use fixed-price contacts due to perceived financial savings).
Fixed-price contracts typically are used when the government is acquiring commercial products.
Id.
246. KEYEs, supra note 216, § 16.11, at 248. The advantages of cost-reimbursement contracts
for the contractor include low risk and flexibility in contract performance. JOHN CIBINIC, JR. &
RALPH C. NASH, JR., COST REIMBURSEMENT CONTRACTING 68 (1981). The element common to
all cost-reimbursement contracts is the Government's obligation to reimburse the contractor for
certain costs incurred during performance. Id. at 382. The particular form of cost-reimburse-
ment may vary. Possibilities include cost (cost reimbursed with no additional fee), cost sharing
(portion of costs reimbursed), cost plus incentive fee (additional fee based on degree of
compliance with target cost), cost plus award fee (additional fee of fixed amount plus award
based on government's evaluation of contract performance), cost plus fixed fee (additional fee
based on degree of compliance with target cost), cost plus award fee (additional fee of fixed
amount plus award based on governments evaluation of contract performance), and cost plus
fixed fee (additional fee set prior to performance). ANDREW K. GALLAGHER, THE LAW OF
FEDERAL NEGOTIATED CONTRACT FORMATION 107-09 (1981).
According to the FAR, cost-reimbursement contracts are suitable for use only if uncertainties
involved in contract performance do not permit an accurate estimate of costs in setting the
terms of a fixed-price contract. 48 C.F.R. § 16.301-2 (1993). Additionally, cost-reimbursement
contracts can only be used if"I[t]he contractor's accounting system is adequate for determining
costs applicable to the contract," id. § 16.301-3(a), and "[appropriate Government surveillance
during performance will provide reasonable assurance that efficient methods and effective cost
controls are used." Id. § 16.301-3(b). The contract also contains a cost ceiling that the
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"the actual cost of the work and the risk thereof are to be assumed by
the government; that is, the contractor is to come out whole,
regardless of contingencies, in performing the work in accordance
with the contract."247  Accordingly, the contractor may seek reim-
bursement from the Government for environmental compliance and
cleanup costs, so long as the costs are "allowable incurred costs." 248
The FAR does not specifically address whether environmental
cleanup or compliance costs are "allowable," and, therefore reimburs-
able. The FAR does, however, set forth factors to be considered in
determining whether costs are allowable.249 In general, the costs
must be reasonable, allocable, and not prohibited by the terms of the
contract or by regulation.S According to the FAR, "a cost is
reasonable if in its nature and amount, it does not exceed that which
would be incurred by a prudent person in the conduct of competitive
business.""' A cost is "allocable" to a government contract if "it is
assignable or chargeable to one or more cost objectives on the basis
of relative benefits received or other equitable relationship." 2
Based on these guidelines, environmental compliance costs incurred
by a contractor in connection with the performance of a government
contract probably would be reimbursable. Whether environmental
cleanup costs would be reimbursable, however, is much less clear.
Some government contractors have taken the position that environ-
mental cleanup costs are properly characterized as ordinary and
contractor may not exceed (except at its own risk) without the approval of the federal agency.
Id. § 16.301-1.
247. 20 Comp. Gen. 632, 635 (1941).
248. 48 C.F.R. § 16.301-1; see KEYES, supra note 216, § 16.13, at 250 (noting that unallowable
costs must be avoided or recouped through contractor's fee award).
249. 48 C.F.RL § 31.201-2(a).
250. Id.
251. Id. § 31.201-3(a). The regulation also identifies several factors for determining whether
a cost is reasonable, including-
(1) Whether it is the type of cost generally recognized as ordinary and necessary for
the conduct of the contractor's business or the contract performance;
(2) Generally accepted sound business practices, arm's length bargaining, and
federal and state laws and regulations;
(3) The contractor's responsibilities to the government, customers, owners of the
business, employees, and the public; and
(4) Any significant deviations from the contractor's established practices.
Id. § 31.201-3(b).
252. Id. § 31.201.4. The FAR further provides that a cost is allocable to a government
contract if it:
(1) Is incurred specifically for the contract;
(2) Benefits both the contract and other work, and can be distributed to them in
reasonable proportion to the benefits received; or
(3) Is necessary to the overall operation of the business, although a direct
relationship to any particular cost objective cannot be shown.
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necessary business expenses and therefore reimbursable by the
Federal Government. 1 3
Certain other provisions of the FAR, however, may also affect
whether environmental cleanup costs are allowed under cost-
reimbursement contracts. Under another section of the FAR,
contingency costs that relate to "a possible future event or condition
arising from presently known or unknown causes, the outcome of
which is indeterminable at the present time"24 generally are
unallowable. 5 The FAR also prohibits reimbursement for fines and
penalties resulting from violations of, or noncompliance with, federal,
state, local, or foreign laws, except when the fine or penalty was
incurred as a result of compliance with specific terms and conditions
of the contract or written instructions from the federal agency." 6
Further, the regulations provide that normal maintenance and repair
costs are allowable if they neither add to the permanent value of the
property nor appreciably prolong its intended life.257  Finally, the
FAR states that certain manufacturing and production engineering
costs are allowable.2 8
Environmental cleanup costs may fall into several categories: costs
for investigation, repair, or replacement of defective waste manage-
ment units; construction of equipment to perform soil and/or ground
water cleanup; operation and maintenance of such equipment; and
prevention of future contamination problems. Under the current
FAR, determining whether environmental cleanup costs are allowable
will depend on (1) how such costs are categorized, (2) whether the
costs resulted from noncompliance with provisions of the contractor's
contract or environmental laws, and (3) the contractor's ability to
253. See DOD to Revisit Draft FAR Cost Principle, Will Reassess Government's Fair Share of Costs, 59
Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 681, 682 (May 24, 1993) [hereinafter DOD to Revisit Draft FAR Cost
Principle] (referring to GAO survey showing that seven of DOD's largest contractors have
requested environmental cleanup cost reimbursements totaling $133 million). According to
Dale Babione, vice president of contracts, Boeing Defense and Space Group, environmental
cleanup costs are treated as ordinary and necessary business expenses by Boeing and included
by Boeing in its total cost base. Id. at 681. Some early cost-reimbursement contracts included
provisions that indemnified the contractor for any act "incident" to the contract. KEYES, supra
note 216, § 16.17, at 252-53. Recent indemnity provisions, however, generally only apply to
specific losses and expenses. Id.
254. 48 C.F.Rt § 31.205-7(a).
255. Id. § 31.205-7(b). An exception exists for "minor unsettled factors," the recognition of
which will speed settlement of reimbursement disputes. Id. The meaning of this exception is
unclear. See KEYES, supra note 216, § 13.14, at 408 (describing § 7(b) as "a very nebulous test").
256. 48 C.FR. § 31.205-15(a).
257. Id. § 31.205-24.
258. Id. § 31.205-25 (a). Allowable costs in this category include "[dieveloping and deploying
new or improved materials, systems, processes, methods, equipment, tools and techniques that
are or are expected to be used in producing products or gervices." Id. § 31.205-25(a) (1).
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negotiate recovery of such costs with the contracting agency-a
difficult task, at best. The current lack of clear regulatory guidance
has resulted in disparate treatment of environmental cleanup costs by
the Federal Government 9 and uncertainty among government
contractors.2 °
Because of the uncertainties concerning the potential liability of
government contractors for environmental cleanup and other costs,
an ad hoc task force of federal agency representatives developed a
"draft environmental cost principle" (DECP) for incorporation into
the FAR.2 1 If adopted, the DECP would establish two categories of
environmental costs: (1) environmental compliance costs, including
costs incurred to prevent environmental damage, properly dispose of
waste, and comply with federal, state, and local environmental
laws;2 2 and (2) environmental cleanup costs. 26 3  Environmental
compliance costs would be allowable under the DECP unless they
resulted from the violation of a law, regulation, or compliance
agreement.2 4 Environmental cleanup costs, however, are presumed
unallowable unless the contractor is able to demonstrate that it:
(1) [w]as performing a [g]overnment contract at the time the
conditions requiring correction were created and performance of
the contract contributed to the creation of the conditions requiring
correction; (2) [w]as conducting its business prudently at the time
the conditions requiring correction were created, in accordance
with then-accepted relevant standard industry practices, and in
compliance with all then-existing environmental regulations,
permits, and compliance agreements; (3) [a]cted promptly to
259. See GAO Says DOD 'Inconsistent' in Reimbursing Cleanup Claims, Urges FAR Cost Principle
[1993] Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 97, at A-29, A-29 (May 21, 1993) (reporting GAO
testimony that DOD acts inconsistently in reimbursing contractors' environmental cleanup
costs).
260. Cf GAO/DOE REPORT, supra note 8, at 10 (concluding that DOE approach to
indemnification results in inconsistent granting of indemnification provisions and contractor
inability to determine scope of indemnification without negotiating with DOE); Experts Offer
Advice to Government Contractors on Avoiding Environmental Criminal Liability, 59 Fed. Cont. Rep.
(BNA) 682, 682 (May 24, 1993) (recounting views of associate general counsel for Martin
Marietta that current nature of government contracting increases contractors' exposure to
liability for environmental damage).
261. Allowable Costs, Environmental Cost Prindple Cleared for Issuance as Proposed Rule, 58 Fed.
Cont. Rep. (BNA), at 184, 184 (Aug. 17, 1992). The DECP originally was expected to be issued
as a proposed rule late in 1992, but was delayed when President Bush imposed a general
moratorium on regulations. DOD to Revisit Draft FAR Cost Principle, supra note 253, at 681. The
issuance was further delayed by the Clinton administration's decision to review significant
regulations carried over from the Bush administration. Id.
262. Draft FAR Environmental Cost Principle, reprinted in 57 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 692, 692
(May 4, 1992) (§ 31.205-9(a) (i)).
263. Id. (§ 31.205-9(a) (ii)).
264. Id. (§ 31.205-9(b)).
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minimize the damage and costs associated with correcting it; and
(4) [h]as exhausted or is diligently pursuing all available legal and
contributory sources.., to defray the environmental costs.es
The DECP specifically addresses a situation that occurs in many
CERCLA cleanups. Under CERCLA's strict and joint and several
liability provisions, a government contractor may be required to clean
up environmental conditions that it did not cause or contribute to
merely because the contractor is the facility's current operator.266
The DECP provides that such costs are unallowable, and therefore not
reimbursable, unless the current contractor demonstrates that: (1)
the previous owner, user, or other lawful occupant's actions satisfy the
first three elements described in the preceding paragraph; and (2)
the government contractor complied with the third and fourth
elements described in the preceding paragraph during the period that
it has owned, used, or occupied the property.
267
The DECP has been widely criticized by government contrac-
tors.2  At a recent congressional hearing, representatives of Aerojet
General Corporation, Lockheed Corporation, and the Boeing
Company contended that the DECP was unnecessary because current
FAR provisions are adequate to deal with the allowability of environ-
mental costs. 269  In addition, government contractors believe that
the DECP will have an "immediate adverse financial impact on some
contractors" because of financial statement changes necessary to
account for cleanup costs that are presumed to be unallowable under
the DECP. 2
70
The Public Contract Law Section of the American Bar Association
(ABA) proposed significant revisions to the draft environmental cost
265. Id. (§ 31.205.9(c)).
266. See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1) (1988) (applying CERCLA liability to "owner and operator
of a ... facility").
267. Draft FAR Environmental Cost Principle supra note 262, at 692 (§ 31.205.9(d)).
268. See Federal Contract Regulation: Changes in Contracting Audit Practices Likely, [Special
Report] Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 28, at S-15, S-16 (Feb. 12, 1993) (noting
contracting industry's vehement objection to DECP presumption that cleanup costs are
unallowable).
269. DefenseDepartment Reimbursement of Contractors'Environmental Cleanup Costs: HearingBefore
the Subcomm. on Legislation and National Security of the House Comm. on Government Operations, 103d
Cong., 1st Sess. 141 (1993) [hereinafter DefenseDepartment Reimbursement Hearings] (testimony of
Dale R. Babione, vice president of contracts, Defense and Space Group, Boeing Co.); id. at 112
(testimony of Ronald R. Finkbiner, vice president of contracts and pricing, Lockheed Corp.);
id. at 49 (testimony of Suzanne L. Phinney, vice president, Environmental, Aerojet General
Corp.).
270. See Allowable Costs, Environmental Cost Principle Cleared for Issuance as Proposed Rule, supra
note 261, at 184.
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principleY.2 1 The ABA believes that treating environmental cleanup
costs as presumptively "unallowable" is inconsistent with the existing
FAR framework for determining cost allowability.2 2  The ABA
proposes that, absent an administrative or judicial showing that a
contractor violated a fault-based environmental law, remediation costs
should be characterized as ordinary and necessary business expenses
in pricing government contracts. 273 The ABA also recommends that
the DECP be revised to expressly recognize that liability under
CERCLA does not constitute a "violation" of law for cost allowability
purposes. 4
The potential impact of the DECP on government contractors is
significant. According to a recent GAO survey, future environmental
cleanup costs for fifteen of DOD's largest contractors are estimated
to total $2.1 billion.275 At a congressional hearing, the DOD Deputy
Under Secretary for Environmental Security acknowledged that, as a
policy matter, DOD must determine the Government's "fair share" of
cleanup costs in cases where there is no determination of fault.
276
Accordingly, DOD has initiated an audit of environmental costs at five
government contractor sites to determine the allowability of environ-
mental costs and develop guidance and procedures regarding the
allowability of such costs. 2 77 The DECP probably will not be issued
as a proposed rule until the audit is completed. 78 While no formal
271. See Richard Hopf, ABA Section Members Meet to Discuss Environmental Cost Principle, 58 Fed.
Cont. Rep. (BNA), at 12 (Oct. 5, 1992).
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. Id. But see Federal Contract Regulation: Changes in Contracting, Audit Practices Likely, supra
note 268, at S-16 (arguing that hardline environmental stance of Vice President Gore makes
concessions favorable to ABA position unlikely).
275. Defense Department Reimbursement Hearings, supra note 269, at 6 (testimony of Donna M.
Heivilin, Director, Defense Management and NASA Issues, General Accounting Office).
276. Defense Department Reimbursement Hearings, supra note 269, at 29 (testimony of Sherri
Wasserman Goodman, Esq., Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Environmental Security,
Department of Defense).
277. See DCAA, DCMC Announce Pilot Audit Program to Develop Guidance on Allowable Costs, 59
Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 707, 707-08 (May 31, 1993) [hereinafter Pilot Program Announcement).
The audit is being conducted jointly by the Defense Logistics Agency's Contract Management
Command (DCMC) and the Defense Contract Audit Agency (DCAA). Id. The DCMC and
DCAA recently issued joint guidance on accounting for environmental remediation costs. See
Memorandum from Robert P. Scott & MichaelJ. Thibault to Environmental Pilot Project Teams
(Apr. 13, 1994) (on file with The American University Law Review). The guidance document
addresses questions raised by the environmental pilot teams. The guidance does not have the
force and effect of law; it does, however, indicate the position government auditors will take.
Among the topics addressed in the document are (1) capitalization of environmental cleanup
costs, (2) treatment of environmental cleanup costs incurred on property held for sale, and (3)
allocation of costs of past environmental contamination. Id.
278. Pilot Program Announcement, supra note 277, at 708 (reporting DOD decision to "revisit"
DECP in light of DOD's desire to pay "fair share" of environmental ,costs).
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completion date has been established, the audit is considered a "high
priority" within DOD and will include a comprehensive final re-
port.27'9 The audit is likely to be reviewed and used by DOD and
other federal agencies as a guide for addressing the allowability of
environmental costs under cost-reimbursement contracts.
2. Fixed-price contracts
Fixed-price contracts provide for a predetermined firm contract
price.2" A fixed-price contract's price is determined by the
contractor's cost experience in performing the contract, and generally
is not subject to any adjustment.281  As a result, such contracts
subject the contractor to maximum risk and full responsibility for all
costs and resulting profit or loss.
According to the FAR, fixed-price contracts are "suitable for
acquiring commercial products or commercial-type products ... or
for acquiring supplies or services on the basis of reasonably definite
functional or detailed specifications."8 2  The regulations suggest
situations where this type of contract may be appropriate, including
situations where performance uncertainties can be identified and
reasonably quantified.283  DOE is reportedly increasing its use of
fixed-price contracts for environmental restoration projects. 2 4  In
negotiating fixed-price contracts, government contractors will likely
increase their contract prices commensurate with the amount of
environmental risk they perceive.
The government contractor's ability to recover for increased
environmental compliance costs or liabilities not originally accounted
for is limited to situations where the Government agrees to modify
the contract.285  For example, in Warner Electric, Inc.,286 the
Veterans' Administration Board of Contract Appeals held that a
contractor was not entitled to recover additional chemical disposal
costs incurred by the contractor as a result of new EPA regulations
279. Id. at 707.
280. 48 C.FR. § 16.201 (1993). The regulations permit price adjustment in fixed-price
contracts when there are unstable market or labor conditions and when contingencies arise that
are beyond the contractor's control. Id. § 16.203-2.
281. Id. § 16.202-1.
282. Id. § 16.202-2.
283. See id. § 16.202-2(d) (suggesting that firm fixed-price contracts should be used when
there is adequate price competition, reasonable comparisons with prior activity, or when there
is information to yield accurate costs of performance).
284. See HWAC Urges DOE, supra note 245, at 290.
285. See 48 C.F.R. § 52.236-1(b) (stating that contracting officer will determine if modi-
fication to contract will be made).
286. 85-2 B.C.A. (CCH) 1 18,131 (May 10, 1985).
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promulgated six days after the contracting officer issued an invitation
for bids.287
Fixed-price contracts often contain provisions that impose on the
government contractor the burden of identifying potential environ-
mental issues associated with a project.288 Pursuant to the FAR, a
"site investigation and conditions affecting the work" clause requires
certain fixed-price construction contracts and fixed-price demolition
or removal of improvements contracts. 289  Additionally, these
contracts must contain a "differing site conditions" provision."
This clause allows the federal agency to make an equitable adjustment
in the contract price, but only in limited circumstances. 291 When
requesting an adjustment pursuant to this provision, the contractor
must give the federal agency prompt notice of the condition before
the condition is disturbed.1 2
DOE's increasing use of fixed-price contracts for environmental
restoration projects is problematic because it imposes significant
environmental risks on government contractors. It is often impossi-
ble, even after conducting a thorough investigation, to identify the
potential costs and liabilities associated with contamination. 291
Often, the extent of an environmental problem is not fully known
until remediation activities have commenced.294 Consequently, if
the contractor is conducting environmental cleanup activities under
287. See Warner Elec. Inc., 85-2 B.C.L (CCH) 1 18,131, at 90-997 to -99 (May 10, 1985)
(ruling that Government passed EPA regulations as sovereign, and was therefore not liable for
results in capacity as contracting party).
288. See 48 C.F.R. §§ 52.236-2(a), 52.236-3(a) (1993) (requiring contractor to investigate all
physical conditions at worksite and report to contracting officer any subsurface or unknown
physical conditions that will affect, and be effected by, work).
289. Id. § 36.503; see also id. § 52.236-3 (providing model "site investigation and conditions
affecting the work" provision). The model contract language provides:
[The contractor] acknowledges that it has taken steps reasonably necessary to ascertain
the nature and location of the work, and that it has investigated and satisfied itself as
to the... conditions which can affect the work or its cost, including but not limited
to... (1) conditions bearing upon transportation, disposal, handling, and storage of
materials.
Id.
290. Id. § 36.502.
291. Id. § 52.236-2(a). Equitable adjustments can only be made for:
(1) subsurface or latent physical conditions at the site which differ materially from
those indicated in [the] contract, or (2) unknown physical conditions at the site, of an
unusual nature, which differ materially from those ordinarily encountered and
generally recognized as inhering in work of the character provided for in the contract.
Id.
292. Id. § 52.236-2(b).
293. See HWAC Urges DOE supra note 245, at 290 (noting that government contractors often
face "substantial technical uncertainties") (citing Marilyn Meigs, ICF Kaisers Engineers Co.).
294. See HWAC Urges DO, supra note 245, at 290 (pointing out that relevant site conditions
may be subsurface and not clearly apparent).
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a fixed-price contract that contains the model contract provisions, the
contractor will be unable to recover any increased cleanup costs. The
contractor may, however, recover some costs if it can show, to the
satisfaction of the federal contracting officer, that subsurface
conditions materially differed from identified conditions, or that the
nature and extent of contamination actually encountered was
somehow unusual in nature and previously unknown."5
B. Indemnification for Environmental Liabilities
One of the most controversial issues currently confronting
government contractors is the extent to which contractors should be
indemnified for environmental liabilities. Members of Congress and
the Clinton administration believe that current federal agency
indemnification policies afford government contractors too much
liability protection. 296 Contractors, however, are calling for addition-
al limits on liability, particularly in the context of environmental
cleanups.297
Federal agencies can use several different statutory and non-
statutory means of indemnifying government contractors against
environmental liabilities: 298  (1) negotiated provisions in cost-
reimbursement contracts requiring the agency to fully reimburse
contractors for environmental compliance and/or cleanup liabili-
ties;29 (2) "provisions that make profit-making contractors potential-
ly responsible for some costs, such as those resulting from negligence
295. See 48 C.F.R § 52.236-2(a)-(c) (1993) (requiring contractor to give written notice of
subsurface or unknown physical conditions that differ from conditions normally encountered
in order to receive equitable adjustment in contract).
296. Representative John D. Dingell, Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce
Committee, recently accused the DOE of giving cleanup contractors too much liability
protection. Dingell Says DOE Offers Contractors Too Much Liability Protection, supra note 241, at 5.
Similarly, DOD Deputy Under Secretary for Environmental Security Sherri Wasserman Goodman
recently informed a House Government Operations subcommittee that the Clinton administra-
tion "does not intend to reimburse cleanup costs incurred by contractors that violated specific
environmental laws or regulations, nor does it intend to reimburse unreasonable amounts of
such costs." Defense Department Reimbursement Hearings, supra note 269, at 29 (statement of Sherri
Wasserman Goodman, Esq., Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Environmental Security,
Department of Defense).
297. Thirteen industry groups and more than 40 government contractors have endorsed a
position paper calling on DOD to indemnify contractors against strictjoint and several liability
under federal and state laws, and to assume responsibility for claims above a certain percentage
of the contract price. Industry Calls for Negligence Standard, Limits on Liabilily for Cleanup Work, 57
Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 830, 830-31 (June 1, 1992).
298. See, e.g., GAO/DOE REPORT, supra note 8, at 1 (discussing DOE's approaches to
indemnifying contractors for cleanup costs).
299. GAO/DOE REPORT, supra note 8, at 1. By negotiating a specific provision addressing
environmental cost reimbursement, the contractor is able to avoid issues relating to whether
such costs are allowable under the FAR guidelines. See supra notes 244-79 and accompanying
text (discussing cost-reimbursement contracts).
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or willful misconduct by a contractor's employees";311 (3) "special
indemnification clauses written into individual contracts" limiting a
contractor's liability for environmental costs; 30' (4) "protection from
unusually hazardous risks under Public Law 85-504";..2 and (5)
"protection from liability from nuclear accidents under the Price-
Anderson Act."0 3
Recent studies indicate that federal agencies use inconsistent
approaches for indemnifying government contractors. 4  Some
contractors have received only one form of indemnification, while
others have received potentially more favorable terms.305  Thus,
government contractors should be aware of the available indemnifica-
tion approaches and be prepared to negotiate such provisions during
contract talks. The current emphasis by federal agencies on environ-
mental costs, however, undoubtedly will make it increasingly difficult
for contractors to negotiate the type of favorable indemnification and
reimbursement terms contained in prior government contracts.06
The cost reimbursement provision negotiated by AT&T Technolo-
gies in its nonprofit contract for operating Sandia National Laborato-
ries for DOE illustrates the types of protections available to govern-
ment contractors.0 7 The contract states, in part:
300. GAO/DOE REPORT, supra note 8, at 1.
301. GAO/DOE REPORT, supra note 8, at 1.
302. GAO/DOE REPORT, supra note 8, at 1; see also National Defense Contracts Act, Pub. L.
No. 85-804, 72 Stat. 972 (1958) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1431 (Supp. IV 1992)) (allowing
indemnification under certain defense-related contracts).
303. GAO/DOE REPORT, supra note 8, at 1; see also Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2011
(1988) (stating U.S. policy regarding development and control of atomic energy).
304. See GAO/DOE REPORT, supra note 8, at 1-2 ("DOE has not performed a comprehensive
analysis to determine how to indemnify its cleanup contractors. Rather, DOE has selected
indemnification approaches on an individual basis, often as part of contract negotiations."); see
also Defense Department Reimbursement Hearings, supra note 269, at 11 (statement of Donna M.
Heivilin, Director, Defense Management and NASA Issues, National Security and International
Affairs Division, General Accounting Office) (stating that DOD has been inconsistent in its
decisions on "whether and how much to reimburse contractors" for their environmental cleanup
efforts).
305. GAO/DOE REPORT, supra note 8, at 2; seeDOE Contract Management: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. 87 (1993) [hereinafter DOE Hearings] (statement of Rep. Dingell) ("DOE's
indemnification policies have resulted in providing blank checks to DOE Contractors ... to
defend themselves against paying damages for injuries caused by the contractor's own poor
environmental practices.").
306. See DOE Hearings, supra note 305, at 93-94 (statement of Hazel O'Leary, Secretary of
Energy). Secretary O'Leary stated:
With respect to civil penalties, it's my belief and sense that it makes no sense for the
American taxpayer to be reimbursing contractors for civil penalties. That has got to
stop, and it has got to stop, first of all, through directive from this Secretary. We have
taken that matter under hand and I will be, today, signing such a directive.
Id.
307. See GAO/DOE REPORT, supra note 8, at 4 (discussing complete indemnification of
contracts involved with nuclear weapons production).
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[I] t is agreed that no cost or expense.., shall be denied payment
by the DOE as outside the scope of this Contract, unless the
Contracting Officer shall establish that such cost or expense
resulted from willful misconduct or bad faith on the part of some
corporate officer having complete or substantially complete charge
of the Sandia National Laboratories.308
This clause is broad enough to encompass environmental costs and,
notably, shifts the burden of proving that an expense is not reimburs-
able from the contractor to the federal agency. For profitmaking
contractors, DOE has implemented an "accountability" rule, which
provides that contractors are liable for certain avoidable costs, such
as costs resulting from negligence or willful misconduct by their
employees.30 9 The contractor's liability for avoidable costs is subject
to a cap, and the Government is responsible for costs over the cap
amount.3 1 0
Similarly, contractors may be able to negotiate special provisions
that modify standard federal agency contract clauses. For example,
a provision in General Electric Company's nonprofit contract at
DOE's Knolls Laboratory states that "[a]ll costs incurred by the
Contractor... with respect to any and all liabilities, damages, claims,
demands, fines, sanctions, or penalties arising out of environmental
... activities" will be allowable costs.31'
As noted, the Anti-Deficiency Acte1 2 is one potential limitation on
a federal agency's ability to provide contractors with liability protec-
tion. Because indemnification clauses commit the agency to pay an
indefinite sum of money at a future date if certain events occur, there
is no way to determine whether there are sufficient funds in the
agency's appropriation to cover the liability when it arises. Although
the Comptroller General has ruled that open-ended indemnification
provisions contravene the Anti-Deficiency Act,313 not all indemnity
contracts are proscribed by the Comptroller General's opinion. An
agency may grant an indemnification that is authorized by statute,1 4
308. GAO/DOE REPORT, supra note 8, at 4.
309. 48 C.F.R. § 970.5204-56 (1993).
310. Id. § 970.5204-55.
311. GAO/DOE REPORT, supra note 8, at 5.
312. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341,1349-1351,1511-1519 (1988 & Supp. V 1993); see also supra notes 154-
57 and accompanying text (discussing constraints placed on agencies contracting for
environmental cleanup by Anti-Deficiency Act).
313. See B-201072, 83-1 Comp. Gen. Procurement Dec. (BNA) 1 501, at 9-10 (May 12, 1983)
(reconsidering and upholding earlier decision invalidating indemnification clause used in cost-
reimbursement contracts).
314. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 10,789, 3 C.F.R. 426 (1954-1958), ripinted as amended in 50
U.S.C. § 1431 (1988) (allowing Government to provide for unlimited indemnification in
contracts involving nuclear or unusually hazardous activity).
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or where the maximum amount of liability is fixed or readily
ascertainable, and where the agency had sufficient funds in its
appropriation that could be obligated or administratively reserved to
cover the maximum liability. 15
Some statutes also authorize federal agencies to provide indemnifi-
cation to government contractors under specific circumstances. For
example, under the Price-Anderson Amendments Act of 1988,1' the
Government provides indemnification protection from nuclear
incidents or nuclear waste activities to all DOE contractors that bear
the risk of a nuclear incident. 17 Federal agencies are also autho-
rized to provide extraordinary contract relief under the National
Defense Contracts Act 18 if a contractor's activities are necessary to
facilitate the national defense. 19 This authority, in conjunction with
an Executive Order,2 ° allows federal agencies to enter into con-
tracts containing provisions that indemnify contractors against
unusually hazardous or nuclear risks. 21 Federal agencies, however,
have broad discretion in deciding whether to offer this type of
indemnification. 22
C. Special Protection for Response Action Contractors
Under CERCLA, a "response action contractor" responsible for
environmental cleanup at a site listed on the Federal Superfund list
is not liable to any person for "injuries, costs, damages, expenses, or
other liability ... which results from such release or threatened
release." 2' This liability protection is limited, however, because it
does not apply to a release caused by conduct of the response action
contractor that is "negligent, grossly negligent, or which constitutes
intentional misconduct."
324
315. B-201072,83-1 Comp. Gen. Procurement Dec. (BNA) 1501, at7 (May 12, 1993); see also
48 Comp. Gen. (GAO) 361, 364 (Nov. 26, 1968) (holding that selective service may indemnify
carriers for damage to vehicles in absence of statute because damage will be limited to value of
vehicles); 42 Comp. Gen. (GAO) 708, 712 (June 19, 1963) (allowing FAA to include liability
clause in contracts because maximum liability is measurable), overruled in part by 54 Comp. Gen.
824, 826 (1975).
316. 42 U.S.C. § 2011 (1988).
317. Id. § 2210.
318. 50 U.S.C. § 1431.
319. Id.
320. Exec. Order No. 10,789, 3 C.F.R. 426 (1954-1958), reprinted as amended in 50 U.S.C.
§ 1431.
321. Id. § 1A(a), 50 U.S.C. § 1431.
322. Currently, only one of 27 management and operations contracts offers the contractor
protection available under this Act, and another three provide that DOE will seek such
indemnification if it becomes necessary. GAO/DOE REPORT, supra note 8, at 16.
323. 42 U.S.C. § 9619(a) (1) (1988).
324. Id. § 9619(a)(2).
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In addition, CERCLA authorizes EPA and other federal agencies to
indemnify cleanup contractors against liabilities arising out of the
contractor's negligence in performing its cleanup activities, provided
that: (1) the liability covered by the indemnification agreement
exceeds or is not covered by commercially available insurance at a fair
and reasonable price, (2) the contractor made diligent efforts to
obtain insurance, and (3) such diligent efforts are undertaken with
respect to each facility at which work is performed in a multi facility
contract.3" The indemnification agreement also must include
deductibles and limits on the amount of indemnification. 26
In January 1993, EPA issued final guidelines for implementing this
CERCLA provision that significantly limited the potential effect of the
indemnification. 27 The guidelines suggest that EPA intends to offer
indemnification only if it does not receive a sufficient number of
qualified bids or proposals, and the lack of response can be linked to
the absence of indemnification. 2 The guidelines also establish a
sliding scale of limits and deductibles and set a ten-year time limit for
claims. 29
This indemnification policy has not yet been widely used. For
example, GAO reported that DOE has sixteen sites on the Federal
Superfund list, and that twelve contractors have cleanup responsibility
at these sixteen sites. 3 DOE has not used CERCLA to indemnify
any of these contractors. 31  Nevertheless, this provision is likely to
acquire added significance as DOD commences environmental
cleanups at the many military bases slated for closure.
V. CONCLUSION:
MINIMIZING AND MANAGING ENVIRONMENTAL RISKS
The risk of exposure to cleanup and other environmental liabilities
is currently a growing concern among government contractors.
Although government contractors always have been subject to
environmental laws, environmental issues have gained increased
prominence in the context of government contracting because of the
significant potential liabilities associated with the operation, closure,
and cleanup of the nation's military installations and nuclear weapons
325. Id. § 9619(c) (4).
326. Id. § 9619(c) (5) (B).
327. Superfund Response Action Contractor Indemnification, 58 Fed. Reg. 5972 (1993).
328. Id. at 5974.
329. Id. at 5974-75.
330. GAO/DOE REPORT, supra note 8, at 9.
331. GAO/DOE REPORT, supra note 8, at 9.
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facilities. Moreover, EPA increasingly is targeting contractors to pay
for cleanup costs, and the prevailing view in Congress and the
Administration is that contractors have received too much liability
protection."3 2 Thus, contractors are now less likely to receive
favorable indemnification and reimbursement concessions when
negotiating contracts with federal agencies. Moreover, there are no
specific defenses available to contractors for violations of environ-
mental laws, even if the actions that resulted in such violations were
conducted in accordance with the contractor's government con-
tract. s33
Nonetheless, contractors can take some affirmative steps to
minimize their environmental risks when conducting projects under
contract with the Federal Government. First, contractors should make
themselves aware of the potential environmental compliance and
cleanup issues associated with particular projects. At a minimum, the
contractor should identify environmental compliance problems at a
particular facility and develop both technical and legal strategies for
addressing the problems.
Second, contractors should attempt to enter into a cost-reimburse-
ment type of contract, rather than a fixed-price contract, unless
environmental liabilities can be quantified with a high degree of
certainty and taken into consideration in developing the overall
contract price.
Third, contractors should be familiar with the various approaches
available for indemnification and reimbursement. The inconsistent
approaches currently used by federal agencies may assist contractors
in receiving more favorable liability protections, despite the trend
toward more restrictive protections.
Fourth, significant law in this area currently is being developed and
contractors should make every effort to involve themselves in this
effort, either directly or indirectly, through an industry or trade
association. For example, federal agencies are now evaluating various
environmental cost principles that, if adopted in the current draft
format, threaten to affect significantly the contractor's business and
the costs associated with working on government projects. 3  By
332. See supra note 296 and accompanying text.
333. See supra notes 177-236 and accompanying text (reviewing merits of certain defenses
used by government contractors to avoid liability for environmental costs).
334. Under the draft environmental cost principle proposed for the Federal Acquisition
Regulations, environmental cleanup costs are presumed to be unallowable. Draft FAR
Environmental Cost Principle supra note 262, at 692 (§ 31.205-9(c)). The contractor has the
burden of establishing that such costs are allowable. Id.
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getting involved now, contractors can influence the Government's
handling of environmental costs.
Finally, contractors who currently operate or previously operated
federal facilities that are being cleaned up under CERCLA should
become involved in negotiation and implementation of the Federal
Facilities Agreement (FFA) under section 120 of CERCLA.35
Because of CERCLA's strict, joint and several liability provisions,"3 6
contractors that currently operate or previously operated at such
facilities have significant potential liability for response and cleanup
costs. By actively participating in the FFA process, contractors can
ensure that response costs are adequately controlled, that the cleanup
is proceeding in a timely manner, and that their exposure to adverse
publicity is minimized. Until environmental law is fully integrated
with government contracting law, the best that contractors can do is
make affirmative efforts to minimize and manage the potential
environmental risks associated with government projects.
335. 42 U.S.C. § 9620 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
336. See supra notes 43-53 and accompanying text (detailing liability under CERCLA).

